

Issues in Sudan's Current Transitional Period

The Challenges of Eliminating the Alliance of Corruption and Tyranny

By Dr. El Shafie Khidir Said



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kind consent of contributing artists



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1 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Used

TP	The Transitional Period
TG	The Transitional Government
SPLM-N	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/North
SLM/Abdulwahid Nour	Sudan Liberation Movement
NCP	National Congress Party
FFC	Forces of Freedom and Change
RSF	The Rapid Support Forces
TSC	The Transitional Sovereignty Council
RCs	The Resistance Committees
NCC	The National Constitutional Conference
TLC	The Transitional Legislative Council
CD	The Constitutional Document
JLM	The Joint Legislative Meeting
IFIs	International Financial Institutions

2 Summary

Following six months of popular uprising, the Sudanese people overthrew the leaders of the *Ingaz/ Al Bashir* regime in April 2019. That moment crowned three decades of resistance during which many died in torture centers and in theatres of civil war and thousands of political prisoners crowded prisons and “ghost houses.”¹ This was followed by months of continued peaceful protests and fierce repression

¹ Ghost houses are the notorious secret detention and torture centers run by the former regime under the supervision of its most senior leaders. Although the regime claimed that they have closed them down at some point, many victims' testimonies

during which hundreds more were killed and injured to force the military to dissolve a transitional military council that took over following Bashir's ouster. The resulting civilian-military "partnership" that was inaugurated in September 2019, with clear demarcations of the full executive powers of the civilian cabinet and symbolic sovereign powers for a collective council chaired by the military as defined in the 2019 transitional charter, was thrown off track from day one. It was hoped that the civilian-led government would carry out the vital tasks needed to move the country forward. However, the military maintained control over the economy and politics of the country from behind the scenes, while the civilian-led cabinet struggled to provide for the needs of the population with control over less than 20% of public resources. Still, unhappy with the encroachment of macroeconomic reforms introduced by the cabinet on its economic dominance, the military security establishment toppled the untenable cohabitation through the October 25, 2021 coup d'état.

This brief emphasizes the need for all political forces (civilian and armed) and civil society to treat the next phase of the transition, that a political compromise currently under negotiations between the October junta and civilian opposition could lead to, as a make-or-break period on which the hope for a modern stable state is riding. The success of the forthcoming transition could guarantee the unity of the country and take it forward into progress and prosperity.

The brief addresses the complicated issues of Sudan's transition, not least defeating ongoing military rule and building a consensus that helps to achieve an agreed transition and facilitate a national dialogue that addresses issues which have been ignored or addressed ad hoc since the country's independence. In the second part, the paper outlines the priorities for the transition.

Part three examines the challenges facing the transition. The first is the partial and fragile success of the December 2018 Revolution that only toppled the head of the *Ingaz* regime and largely left the control of the national economy in the hands of the military security establishment. The second is the continued lack of a unified approach among the revolution's leaders and fragmentation within their ranks. The third challenge is the presence of armed factions and militias who are ready to intervene in support of one political actor or another.

Part four begins with an acknowledgment that Sudan's current crisis reflects a historical dilemma of nation building that dates to its independence. To emerge from this crisis, the paper suggests a tripartite approach, namely halting the slide toward catastrophe, undertaking thorough reforms, and realizing the nation's development project. It calls for dialogue, underlining that negotiations and avoidance of violence remain a preferred solution for open-ended crisis. However, the paper differentiates between a dialogue that addresses the root causes of the crisis and one that leads to superficial solutions ending at mutual pardons and power sharing.

Part five outlines the priority tasks the next government should address. They include democratic transformation; peace with two major armed groups who have not yet entered into agreements with the government; holding perpetrators of human rights violations accountable; extracting civil, military and police services from the grip of the deep state; forming independent commissions; conducting local elections; reforming education and foreign policy; conducting a population census; initiating national reconciliation based on remedies, reparations and transitional justice; considering possible frameworks for federal governance; holding a constitutional conference; and approving an election act and commission.

Part six suggests an economic program for the TP. It is based on several principles including that no technical economic arrangements will succeed in isolation from politics; that the developmental vision should reflect Sudan's resources and potential and put people first; that ministries and agencies concerned with economic management should be reformed; that the state should engage in planning and redistribution of resources; that domestic solutions to the crisis should be prioritized, with international support playing a supportive role; that the economic collapse should be stopped and a recovery/development program should be developed; that economic development and resource

and human rights reports indicate that the practice of secret detention and torture remained in place until the last day of the regime - A translators' footnote.

distribution questions should be central to any peace agreement and the development of peripheral areas should be central to any national development plan.

Finally, the paper concludes with a call to prioritize overcoming frustration and leveraging the enthusiasm of the masses to meet the current challenges.

Part three examines the challenges facing the transition. The first is the partial and fragile success of the December 2018 Revolution that only toppled the head of the *Ingaz* regime not their political

3 A Steep Climb: The Tasks of Sudan's Transition

The people of Sudan overthrew the leaders of the *Ingaz* regime in April 2019, after four months of popular uprising on the streets of Sudan's villages and cities and following a massive sit-in in front of army headquarters, supported by smaller sit-ins at garrison towns in various states. That moment crowned three decades of resistance during which many died in torture centers and civil war zones, and thousands of activists were held in prisons and "ghost houses." Under the *Ingaz* regime, for the

Priorities of the TG were:

1. End the civil war and achieve an inclusive and just peace.
2. Remove corrupt and tyrannical state institutions and laws, remove all senior government officials in accordance with the law through integrated mechanisms, including the Empowerment Removal Committee.
3. Reform civil and military institutions to realize their national character and wrest them from the hands of the Ingaz/ National Congress Party (NCP) and ensure equitable distribution of opportunities without prejudice in accordance with the principle of meritocracy.
4. Reform and rebuild the justice system so that the independence of the judiciary and rule of law are guaranteed.
5. Annul restrictive laws and enact legislation that accelerates democratic transformation such the trade union act.
6. Hold all members of the former regime who committed crimes against the nation and citizens accountable, including those responsible of the Khartoum massacre of 3rd June 2019.
7. Address the situation of those dismissed from civil and military services on political or "public good" grounds.
8. Implement a recovery program to relieve the suffering of citizens with priority on increasing food availability; providing health, education, housing and social security; providing sanitation; establishing the building blocks of a development scheme that saves the country from economic collapse; implementing affirmative action in favor of marginalized regions; and addressing national, ethnic, and social tensions.
9. Adopt a balanced foreign policy based on independence and common interests, rather than allegiance to blocks; and restore relations with the international aid institutions.
10. Form independent national commissions, including: the Constitutional Conference and Constitution Making Commission; Peace Commission; Anti-Corruption Commission; Transitional Justice Commission; and the Election Commission.
11. Conduct a broad and deep dialogue across the political spectrum, which establishes the foundations of an appropriate governance structure that realizes fair power sharing and distribution among the various national and regional components in Sudan, under a pluralistic democratic system that leads to consensus on the fundamentals of a permanent constitution.

first time in its modern history, Sudan witnessed a massive exodus of its population in search of safety, and the country was divided into two states.

The overthrow of the *Ingaz* leaders opened the door to hope for a TP led by a consensus-based TG based on competence and integrity, rather than political, partisan, or regional quotas. It was also hoped that this government would carry out vital tasks to move the country forward.

It was obvious from the beginning that the revolution would face serious challenges that necessitate sincere attention. Revolutionary forces failed to develop early and effective responses to many of these, setting the stage for the current crisis.

4 Challenges Facing the Transition

The first challenge is that **the revolution was partial and fragile** as it overthrew only the head of the *Ingaz* regime, and not that regime's political pillars of strength and control, namely the loyalty of the military and security establishment and its control of the national economy. That core of the Islamist regime for which Bashir was the front has survived and is intent on regaining power and is willing to use force to achieve this aim.

The actors of the old regime have a variety of motivations for clinging to power. One is a desire to maintain the wealth and resource distribution structures that they put in place over 30 years in power, through which they exploited the state machinery and plundered the country's resources. Another concern is that many of the members of this regime were involved in the commission of atrocities under the previous regime and want to shield themselves from accountability for these crimes.

When these privileges were partially threatened, these forces staged the 25 October coup to defend their resource networks and maintain the immunity that they currently enjoy. They are now exploiting the control gained via the coup to fund activities including attacks on trade unions, instigating tribal and regional conflicts, undermining the prestige of the state, and deploying misinformation, rumormongering, and disseminating hate speech through state and social media platforms. These activities receive support from loyal *Ingaz* members in state institutions including the judiciary and the office of the Prosecutor General. They remain in power supported by armed forces in alliance with corrupt forces that oppose the peoples' revolution.

These forces are reinforced by the polarization orchestrated by foreign blocks. Some of these blocks seek to consolidate support for the *Ingaz* for their own political or economic ends. On the other side of the proxy war, counter blocks endeavor to achieve their own interests, declaring that they are positioned on the side of the revolution, while using tactics harmful to the aspirations of the Sudanese people.

If the attempt of the custodians of the defunct regime to derail the revolution, not caring about the possibility of a bloody conflict was expected, the poor performance of the transitional government and their "political incubator,"² the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), was not. This poor performance opened the door for the counter-revolution.

The continued lack of a unified vision and approach among the revolution's leaders to the new post-revolution reality represents a second serious challenge. Some leaders assessed the scope of obstacles to the revolution and concluded that some type of accommodation was needed. They argued that these goals cannot be achieved in a one-off move but through smart tactics that prevent the expansion and cohesion of the counter-revolutionary alliance in the long term, while at the same time

² Translator's note: In the current political fluidity in Sudan, the coalition that supports the TG is called the "political incubator", to suggest its likeness to start-up incubator. It conveys a sense that the TG has some independence but is also part of a coalition. The incubator is the social/political base of the TG.

consolidating revolutionary forces. However, other revolutionary groups view this position as a betrayal of the revolution.

These differences have led to **fragmentation and cleavages** among the revolution's forces, driven by mutual recrimination. This allowed the counter-revolution the opportunity to catch its breath and escalate its vicious counterattack. Differences of opinion among the revolutionary forces are not problematic per se, but the failure to manage them is. More annoying is the fact that such differences are dominant while the vision is lacking among every faction. In any case, these differences will not lead to the triumph of one idea or faction over the others. Rather, the outcome will be obstruction of the tasks of the TP.

The way out rests in an objective evaluation of the role of main actors in the present political scene, including the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF); building consensus on priorities; avoidance of being absorbed in superficial differences which are exploited by counter revolutionary forces in sophisticated ways, remembering that many more things unite than divide revolutionary forces; and that the nation and her revolution are more important than individuals and are in eminent danger. The leaders of the revolution must also be vigilant and avoid populism that would drive them to shift their positions in unwise ways to keep up with the slogans on the street. A genuine leader must feel the pulse of the masses and exercise leadership skills to translate these into positions that reflect the needs and desires of the people while also making tactical decisions to advance them effectively.

The third serious challenge is the presence of **multiple armed groups and militias in the country**. News reports indicate that militias abroad are ready to intervene in support of certain political actors. Should we close our eyes to this fact, and act as if these militias do not exist, or do we deal wisely with them to prevent repeating the experiences of Libya, Syria and Yemen?

5 From Historical Crisis to Reconstruction

The current fragile situation is a result of the failure of successive post-independence governments, whether military or civilian, to engage in state-building. The *Ingaz* regime only worsened the situation over its three decades in power. It identified the state with the ruling party and imposed its interpretation of Islam, using it as an ideological cover for racial and religious supremacy. This created the context for civil war. Further they enabled parasitic groups of regime profiteers to drain the nation's resources. Escaping this situation requires a tri-partite process: a) stopping the slide toward catastrophe; b) undertaking thorough reforms; and c) embarking on the realization of the nation's development project.

Not all aspects of this process can be completed by the anticipated TG to come out of current search for a negotiated end to the political stalemate, but this TG should start the process. The more effectively they begin, the more likely the long-term prospects for success. To be sure, no single faction, including the FFC, can accomplish this alone. This is a historic mission, full of challenges and difficulties which can sow frustration and despair even among the enthusiastic persons. In this context, it has the best chance of success if it lies on the shoulders of the broadest possible coalition. However, being aware that the alternative is frightening barbarism which will fragment and destroy the country.

The philosophy of transition allows everyone, with varied political and intellectual visions, to agree on a national program that sets out the approaches and methods to break this vicious cycle. However, Sudanese political forces are not facilitating such a transition, but rather failing to respond to the root causes of crisis. Similar dynamics have derailed four previous transitions. Two of those failed experiences ended with totalitarian military regimes that dominated the country in 1958 and 1969. A third led to the domination of the *Ingaz* regime in 1989. The fourth failed transitional experience, in 2011, led to the split of Sudan into two countries.

Today Sudan is experiencing its fifth post-colonial transition, and there are reasons to be concerned that it may similarly fail. The political elite, whether in power, allied with those in power or in opposition lacks foresight and seems ignorant of the modern history of Sudan; including the disastrous outcomes of the previous four transitions. A new course is needed. Scattered efforts across the country should come together into collective political action able to defeat the 25 October coup. Collaboration is necessary for the popular struggle to achieve its desired goal of uprooting the *Ingaz* regime and creating a consolidated democracy in which citizens enjoy freedom, justice, dignity and political, ethnic, and cultural diversity.

The journey to reconstruction begins with all Sudanese coming together, represented by relevant organizations to expand common ground and define the necessary boundaries between the state and the ruling regime to deter any individual or group from excluding others or imposing their own illusions.

In principle, dialogue, negotiations, and avoidance of violence are the preferred options for resolving problems. However, it is necessary to differentiate between a dialogue that addresses root causes and one that is superficial. The purpose of any negotiations is to alter the balance of power. However, limiting the dialogue to political elites in closed door sessions limits such rebalancing in favor of the party in power. In Sudanese history, all that such negotiations have produced is power sharing, neglecting the demands of the people and perpetuating the crisis.

No dialogue will be successful unless it creates a TP that not only removes the military from power but is tasked first and foremost with completely liquidating the forms of kleptocratic and repressive government that led to the crisis and developing a new form of governance codified in a democratic constitution that safeguards the rights of all and spares the country bloody conflict and ensures the control of the state over its resources and public funds. A successful dialogue must also be subject to public engagement and scrutiny.

6 An Agenda for Action: Key Priorities for the Transition

The ongoing political process is supposed to lead to a new political reality including a civilian government to oversee a new twenty-four-month long transition following the political paralysis that resulted from the October 2021 coup. The following are the recommended priorities for action by the government:

1. Conduct an honest and robust engagement with the past. Initiate a **national reconciliation** based on redress, reparations for damages and launch a **transitional justice** initiative. The goal is not to absolve oneself, justify failures, or to shift the burden of failure to another group, but resolve underlying tensions and address injustice. These steps need not only to be taken but also to be clearly communicated to the public. This should include **ensuring accountability for human rights violations, including for all crimes committed in the course of the June 3, 2019 dispersal of the sit-in and against protesters both before and after the 25 October coup.**
2. The new TG should **ensure appointment of competent staff.** Mistakes that accompanied the formation of the first TG must not be repeated. Although there was scrutiny of nominations for senior posts received from the FFC, the process focused only on political screening as there was no mechanism for assessing competence and expertise. In part, the lack of scrutiny was based on an assumption that the TSC was an honorary body that would not engage much on practical issues, although it included the “military component.” Therefore, the nominations for membership in the TSC lacked political weight and experience. This led to a fatal mistake, as the TSC was a major center of political controversy. New competency must be injected into the upcoming TG and public

transparency about decision making would help to drive appropriate appointments. Nominees should be subjected to media scrutiny, and each should present his/her vision about how to manage their respective ministries in a conversation led by specialists, media professionals, and representatives of the population at large.

3. The next TG must **negotiate a peace deal with the non-signatory rebel movements**. They should strive to convene an *ad hoc* national conference on inclusive peace, attended by all stakeholders from conflict zones, and other political and civil forces. The conference must discuss how to combine the outcomes of the various peace agreements to lay the foundations for a sustainable peace. The leaders of the TP took a weak approach to peace making with the SPLM/North led by Abdulaziz Al-Hilu, and the SLM led by Abdulwahid Nur, despite the agreed Declaration of Principles (DoP), which seems to have been forgotten.
4. Hold a **National Constitutional Conference** to build consensus on the issues related to the form of government, relationship of religion to the state, identity, and the fundamentals of the constitution, which will be included in the draft of a permanent constitution. The conference should agree on a **road map** and an implementable **plan of action** to address the crisis as well. The signatories of the proposed Political Declaration and the Transitional Constitution should have an opportunity to participate, and Resistance Committees (RCs) should be encouraged to do the same. The *Ingaz* regime and their NCP allies should not be allowed to participate.
5. Agree on an **Electoral Commission and an election law** that circumvents the negative aspects of previous democratic experiences (after independence, 1956; after October Revolution, 1964; and after April Uprising, 1985) and allows for the organization of **local council elections**. These councils can play a role in overseeing the national government and transitional agencies, as well as link directly with the livelihoods of citizens. In such elections voters are likely to have more direct experience with the candidate, rather than simply knowing them through their party, therefore, voters are more likely to vote for the candidate capable of serving them, regardless of their party affiliation. In short, it is a fundamental exercise in the process of a bottom-up democratic transition. The experience of local council elections may generate ideas about which electoral system is best for our country considering the apparent weakness of our exhausted political parties.

Care must be taken to adopt policies suited to Sudan's reality rather than blindly copying Western models which have failed in the past. Such models must recognize the distinctive characteristics of the Sudan reality with its ethnic, sectarian and ideological complexities, and at the same time preserves the unique essence of democracy, represented in the package of rights and freedoms, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, separation of powers, respect for pluralism, and peaceful transfer of power.

6. Establish a **Transitional Legislative Council (TLC)**, as stipulated in the 2019 Constitutional Document (CD). In the previous TP, the leaders and their political incubator, the FFC failed to fulfil this important obligation. This failure was one of the drivers behind the turmoil that characterized the first phase of the TP and fueled protests in which shootings were common. The period was also marked by the struggle to control important institutions including the judiciary and the public prosecutor's bureau, reflecting a collapse of rule of law. Considering the instability of the new institutional mechanisms required for revolutionary change and the failure to shake the core of the *Ingaz* deep state, which continues to obstruct change, a legislative authority would represent a strong guarantee for political and societal transformation in the TP.

In periods of transition, political and social competition is intense, and if legislative institutions are unable to function as oversight bodies, the political process is more likely to fail. An effective TLC is the only institution capable of guaranteeing a successful political and democratic transformation, combating the tendencies of exclusion or hijacking people's aspirations for change. Of course, as the TLC will not be elected, its powers will be limited to oversight of the performance of the government, holding it accountable, and changing its composition, if necessary, to prevent abuse

of power and protect the rights and freedoms of citizens, in addition to enacting the necessary legislation for the removal of the *Ingaz* regime, and other relevant legislation. Issues related to rebuilding the state remain outside the powers of the TLC; they are left to the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) and the Legislative Council to be elected following the transitional period.

7. The TG should form **independent national commissions**, an obligation that was only partially undertaken by the previous TG and its political incubator. These commissions are of paramount importance and will play a crucial role in the success of the TP. They represent important mechanisms for wresting the hijacked state from the grip of the NCP, and for achieving an effective transition.
8. The TG adopt principles of **consultation, transparency, and accountability**. This requires developing appropriate mechanisms to regularly address the public. Such communication has been lacking, even though it is one of the important pillars of good state administration. It is a visible symbol of good governance, contributing to raising morale. One of the mistakes of the previous TG was that it contented itself with formulating its visions and responses to the dilemmas of governance behind closed doors, instead of valuing and practicing consultation.

For example, the previous TG faced a set of important questions about how to escape the current economic crisis and how to reconcile the recommendations of international financial institutions (IFIs) without causing undue distress. Can the state protect the rights of citizens, especially in the areas of health, housing, education, market saturation and price control? Is there an urgent need for a large dose of the market economy, or might other means be more effective? How can we assure the public buy in to laws and policies about the market? The answers to this type of questions require broad transparency and consultations with economists, business leaders, civil society, workers and citizens, which did not happen in the transitional period.

As another example, the previous Council of Ministers held several closed retreats to review and evaluate its performance and agree on a roadmap for the next stage. After each meeting, important decisions were relayed in brief announcements, consisting of general and repetitive headlines known to everyone, without specifying implementation and follow-up mechanisms, while a thorough account of the meetings should have been given to journalists, FFC leaders, RCs, employers, regular forces, various social organizations, and other sectors.

This is not only about valuing consultation and transparency as such, but also about how to engage the public in ensuring the implementation of short- and long-term goals of the transition. Genuine and effective consultation includes experts, then extends to all segments of society. It includes a careful analysis of opportunities and risks as well as the roles of government, the private sector, civil society, and ordinary citizens. Consultation and transparency can be considered among the most important criteria for measuring the extent to which the spirit of the December Revolution has been embraced by the TG.

9. The new TG should establish a **policy-making support office**. At the beginning of the previous TG, a detailed proposal was developed for such an office, reporting directly to the Prime Minister and assisting the government in decision making. The office was to be a governmental unit composed of experts and specialized professional cadres, studying public policy and government functions, and anything assigned by the Prime Minister. It would provide information and develop scenarios and appropriate alternatives. Staff should be selected based on their education, knowledge, expertise, specialization, and professionalism, and not partisan, regional or other political quotas.

Although this proposal was both welcomed and discussed in the Joint Legislative Meeting (JLM),³ it was never adopted. The proposed office exists in many governments, including in stable democracies, under different names and governments rely on it. Countries striving to achieve democratic transformation, political stability and state-building, such as Sudan, are in dire need of such an office, especially as the executive staff in the government lack experience.

10. The new transitional government should pay due attention for **ensuring implementation and follow up**. Any work requires planning, implementation and follow-up. This tripartite action needs attention from the TG, in particular, implementation and follow-up mechanisms, and oversight by the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister.
11. The **National Council for Strategic Planning** is also an important priority for the next TG due to its role in drawing up the state's policies, plans and strategic programs.
12. The upcoming transitional government must **rebuild the human rights and justice system** that was subjected to unprecedented damage during the Ingaz years. The Commission for the Reform of the Legal and Justice System of 2020 was approved in April 2020 and was supposed to rebuild the system and remove the "empowerment structure." This should include the key rights protections **required for a democratic transition** including annulment of legal provisions that violate fundamental freedoms such as those of association, expression, and the press. Laws and provisions that guarantee respect for pluralism and diversity, rights and freedoms, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, separation of powers, independence of trade unions and professional federations, and which guarantee a peaceful and constitutional transfer of power should be enacted.
13. The next transitional government should reform **foreign policy** and set it away from foreign blocks and dependency. Particular attention should be devoted to building a strategic relationship with South Sudan. This should include opening border crossings, ensuring the freedom of cross-border trade, reviewing agreements on oil and related economic matters and the four freedoms, promoting economic and social integration.
14. Restore **civil, military, security, and police services** from the clutches of the deep state, by reviewing their governing laws and structures. Review staff appointments and dismissals including those that were "arbitrary" or "in the public interest," and other grievances of the *Ingaz* era. Then rebuild and structure these institutions on a national basis, without partisanship and political affiliation, prioritizing the judiciary and justice agencies, provided that this overhaul is carried out in accordance with the law.
15. Reform **education** by reviewing curricula; teachers' work conditions; diversifying the types of education available e.g., technical, occupational, academic, and commercial; introduce modern educational theories; and link education to the technological revolution.
16. Carry out a **population census**.
17. Consider adopting new policies of **federal governance**, based on a comprehensive assessment by experts and with the participation of various people sectors, particularly in peripheral regions. Necessary measures must also be taken to enable regions to manage their own affairs, and to expand decentralization. This is associated with the adequacy of resources, fairness of resource distribution based on scientific, well-thought out and effective criteria, as well as affirmative action for the least developed regions with the aim of helping them to advance.

³ According to article 25 (3) of the Constitutional Document, the Joint Legislative Meeting (JLM) performs the functions of the Transitional Legislative Council (TLC) until the TLC is formed. It includes members of the Sovereignty Council and the Cabinet, who exercise this mandate in this joint meeting where they take decisions by consensus or by a two-thirds majority of the members- A translators' footnote.

7 Features of the Economic Program

Acknowledging that the economic crisis was the spark that ignited December 2018 revolution, addressing this crisis represents the corner stone in an overall transition. The mission of such program is to stop economic decline; ease the burden of living expenses; and expose and eliminate sources of corruption in the state and society. Curbing rampant violence and achieving social peace will not be achieved in a context of a collapsing economy. If the next TG wants an alternative economic project to succeed, it must adhere to a set of main principles, including:

1. No economic and technical measures should be taken in isolation from the political process, including attempts to promote economic governance and attract external aid. Such measures cannot succeed unless they are adopted in ways that promote good governance. Popular participation in setting priorities, making development decisions, and scrutinizing economic, social, and cultural policies should be expanded. To facilitate this, access to information, transparency in business transactions, and popular oversight must be ensured. Increased engagement will promote rational management of economic and human resources, create room for highlighting deficiencies in government agencies, expose abuses and deviant practices, and help to fight corruption.
2. Create a realistic vision for development based on the country's economic resources and capacities and prioritizes the basic needs of citizens.
3. Increase the technical and professional capacity of government agencies. Sudan suffers from weak institutions and state administration, as a result of the actions of the Ingaz regime. Therefore, ministries and government agencies concerned with the management of the economy, such as the Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS), the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Commerce must be reformed. Institutional reform requires political will. The Council of Ministers and officials in the various ministries must ensure that senior appointments are merit-based as reform cannot be managed without competent leadership. The CBOS must be liberated from the "financial hegemony" imposed on it, which exacerbated the negative effects of the curse of rentier economy. The CBOS should utilize monetary policy to promote growth, rather than limiting itself to financial and monetary stabilization. The Ministry of Finance should focus on control and oversight of the budget and adjusting the balance between state revenues and expenditures. The Ministry of Commerce should focus on organizing, developing and monitoring internal and external trade activities, the movement of imports and exports, and control the quality of Sudanese exports to improve their competitiveness in foreign markets.
4. The state should adhere to its role in planning, redistribution of resources, control of the external aid flows and conduct development projects. This should enable the state to stimulate the market economy and establish a strong partnership between the public sector, private sector and civil society to develop strategic plans to improve people's lives.
5. Sudan's political and economic crises will never be solved from outside, whether by the efforts of international or regional actors, or by depending on external aid. This does not mean underestimating the important role of the IFIs, donor countries and direct foreign investment, however, internal policies are decisive. Nevertheless, Sudan must prepare and equip itself financially and economically to deal with the IFIs and donor countries and to foreign aid and investments by creating an appropriate environment and fertile soil for these investments. Such an appropriate environment should include political stability, security, safety, rule of law, and institutional reform; and without these conditions, external support will not produce the desired effects.
6. The TG should be fully-civilian led, committed to the democratic reform consistent with the aspirations of the December Revolution, i.e., freedom, peace and justice, and human rights. The

civilian government must use the state apparatus to lay the foundations for a development model that combines economic growth, social development, and people's needs. This can be done by offering investment initiatives, creating an attractive investment environment, supporting small projects, investing in education and scientific research, and creating a competitive economy linked to the global economy taking advantage of technological means and successful commercial diplomacy to open global markets to local products.

7. The state must halt economic collapse and set up a citizen-centered recovery and development program, focusing on impoverished populations. The program to do this should include the following steps:
 - Rationalize government spending. Reduce spending on sovereign offices and the security sector and transfer the surplus to increase spending on key citizen needs such as health, education, provision of clean drinking water, and low-cost housing.
 - Reform the banking system, restore the oversight role of the CBOS, bring credit under its control, and redirect bank loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), especially the artisanal, industry, transportation, and service sectors.
 - Develop a program, with the participation of the employees and other stakeholders, to restore major national public enterprises such as Gezira Scheme and Sudan Railways and develop strategic plans which prioritize the agricultural and husbandry sectors.
 - Return expropriated agricultural lands to their original owners and prohibit expropriation of the land of insolvent farmers.
 - Revive the cooperative movement and provide special support to farmers' cooperatives.
 - Enact a law to control the rental rates of houses and land.
 - Adopt tax reform based on the principle of progressive taxation.
 - Draft a new labor law, with the participation of employees, the state, and employers, which specifies working conditions, pensions, social security, health care, the right to form independent trade unions and the right to strike.
 - Define minimum and maximum wages limits and adjust them in parallel with prices, through a mechanism that includes the state, the private sector and trade unions.
 - Offer an extreme poverty grant which can help the poorest to survive. The state and trade unions should collaborate to determine its terms, value, and means of financing.
 - Review the financial performance of all state institutions, establish an effective mechanism to recover looted public money, including privileges, exemptions, and support granted to private investments, crackdown on hotbeds of corruption, and bring those responsible to justice.
 - Review deals related to the sale of state-owned land and public sector institutions, while determining the true value of such assets.
 - Review contracts awarded to petroleum, gold, other mineral, electricity and water companies and integrate all accounts into the state budget.

8. Ensure inclusion of a national socio-political and developmental project that consolidates peace through re-distribution of wealth and development plans in order to end the prejudice and marginalization of the least developed regions in Sudan's peripheries in the process of negotiating peace. Ethnic, national and social tensions should be prioritized within the framework of a development project, guided by scientific expertise, experience and the general principles of social justice. The national development project should be based on several pillars, the most important of which are:
 - Observe regional balance and protect vulnerable social strata, because structural distortions in our country have perpetuated the privileges of certain groups, created development disparities between regions, and widened impoverishment.
 - Ensure that all natural resources in Sudan are nationally owned, utilize them in redressing the effects of civil wars, especially on the displaced and refugees; address and remove the root causes of marginalization; reconstruct and rehabilitate agriculture and husbandry,

- infrastructure, education, and health; acquire modern technology to upgrade industry and to combat epidemics, desertification, and protect the environment.
- Distribute revenues generated from natural resources according to agreed percentages, e.g., to the general budget and the state treasury, with emphasis on the preferential treatment for war-affected and less developed areas; to the development budget prioritizing projects in the preferential treatment areas; dedicate a percentage to mineral exploration and extraction areas to be invested in developing infrastructure, creating job opportunities, and providing services such as clean drinking water, health and education.

8 Conclusion

The forthcoming (fifth) transitional period in Sudan requires all political forces (both civilian and armed) and civil society to work together to realize the hope of the Sudanese people in building a modern and stable state. Success in carrying out the transition would move the country towards progress, while failure could lead to civil war and the disintegration of the nation.

To date, however, transitional arrangements have been limited to superficial changes and the redistribution of power. Any project for change, such as the one the Sudanese people's revolution aspires to achieve, that does not promote comprehensive change is doomed to remain illusory.

The current situation in the country may afflict some with frustration and despair that the goals of the revolution will not become a reality, especially those who have been waiting for a long time for change, or who thought that reaping the revolution's fruits would be immediate. While feelings of frustration and despair are expected and understood, we cannot become completely discouraged. In the end, this serves the interests of counter-revolutionary forces and the henchmen of the former regime. Therefore, overcoming frustration and stimulating enthusiasm becomes a top priority because organized and conscious enthusiasm can tip the scales in favor of progress. In defending their revolution, Sudanese revolutionary forces are in dire need of enthusiasm, joyful victories, and even of the tears of temporary defeats. This is important to overcome indifference, to raise the banners of hope and sharpen the will to continue moving forward on the path of change until its desired ends are reached.