

Sudan Conflict Monitor

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Three Years On A Fragmented War, A Persistent Crisis

Executive summary:

Three years into the conflict, Sudan's war has become a fragmented, multi-front crisis shaped by competing centers of authority and deepening civilian vulnerability. Control is divided between SAF and RSF-aligned administrations, both of which continue to expand parallel governance systems while prioritizing military operations.

International engagement—particularly through the Berlin Conference—highlighted renewed support for civilian-led pathways and humanitarian coordination. However, it also exposed sharp divisions over legitimacy and representation, limiting prospects for a unified political process.

On the ground, governance deficits, economic pressures, and coercive practices are fueling civilian grievances in SAF-held areas, while RSF-controlled territories continue to institutionalize parallel systems under severe humanitarian strain. Both sides are increasingly using service delivery, including education, to assert political legitimacy, further entrenching fragmentation.

The conflict continues to rely on remote and dispersed violence, particularly drone warfare, driving civilian casualties, infrastructure damage, and disruptions to humanitarian access. These dynamics are compounded by arbitrary detention,

enforced disappearances, identity-based targeting, displacement, disease outbreaks, and severe humanitarian funding gaps.

Regionally, Sudan's conflict is increasingly tied to wider geopolitical and economic pressures. Cross-border arms flows, refugee movements, and regional insecurity continue to shape the conflict environment, while disruptions linked to the Iran–Israel war are increasing fuel costs, supply chain constraints, and humanitarian operational challenges.

Looking ahead, Sudan is likely to face continued fragmentation, sustained civilian harm, and a resilient war economy that reinforces conflict incentives. Diplomatic efforts remain constrained by limited leverage and competing international priorities, while the long-term social and economic costs continue to deepen.

Security and Political Developments



The war in Sudan — three years on

Three years after the conflict erupted in April 2023, Sudan's war has evolved into a dispersed, multi-front conflict shaped by drone warfare, [expanding](#) combat in Greater Kordofan and Blue Nile, and fragmented territorial control. Military operations—particularly air and drone strikes—continue to take precedence over governance, as SAF-aligned authorities consolidate control in the capital while RSF-aligned coalitions expand parallel structures in the west.

Political parties and SAF authorities marked the April 6 anniversary of the 1985 overthrow of Nimeiri and the 2019 sit-in. While SAF leadership used the occasion to project alignment with the public, civilian actors continued to [assert](#) that legitimacy derives from popular mobilization rather than military control.

Berlin conference: civilian track amid contested legitimacy

Held on the third anniversary of the war, the [Berlin conference](#) reflected renewed international efforts to support civilian-led political engagement and humanitarian coordination. Organized by Germany with backing from the African Union, United Nations, European Union, Arab League, and the Intergovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD), the conference brought together civilian actors, donors, and international stakeholders across political, humanitarian, and civil society tracks. [Preparatory discussions](#) in Addis Ababa emphasized de-escalation, a humanitarian truce, and a Sudanese-owned political process.

The conference exposed sharp contestation over legitimacy and representation. The SAF-aligned government [rejected](#) the process following its exclusion, calling it a violation of sovereignty, while allied political groups [boycotted](#) the conference and [criticized](#) the invitee structure as unbalanced. Despite this, several SAF-aligned political figures participated among the forty civilian invitees, including representatives of the Gathering of National Forces, Mubarak Ardol, and lawyer Nabil Adeeb. Hardline Islamist groups also organized protests near the venue and [reportedly](#) harassed participants. RSF-aligned actors similarly [questioned](#) the arrangements, citing exclusion and political bias. Several leaders from the pro-RSF Tasis alliance attended a parallel event organized by the Sudan International Contact Group, which emphasized civilian agency and a Sudanese-owned political pathway.

Sudanese civil society groups mobilized around the conference to amplify civilian priorities. A representative of the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) participated in the humanitarian track, while alliances and advocacy campaigns—including the Sudan Civic Conversion Tracks (SCCT), the “Barridouha – Cool It Down” and Sudan Peace Call campaigns, the Sudanese Democratic Civil Society Platform (SDCSP), and women’s and youth-led initiatives—organized side events and press briefings calling for a ceasefire, civilian protection, and improved humanitarian access. Civilian participants agreed on a [consensus document](#) calling for de-escalation, a humanitarian ceasefire, humanitarian access, civilian protection, Sudan’s unity, and accountability for atrocities.

The conference nevertheless produced limited political outcomes. As in the 2025 London conference, disagreements—reportedly involving the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt over language on preserving state institutions—prevented a joint communiqué, leading co-hosts to issue a [statement](#) in their own names. Berlin’s main significance, therefore, lay in advancing humanitarian coordination and testing the prospects for a coherent civilian platform amid an increasingly fragmented conflict landscape.

Fragmented governance and competing claims to legitimacy

Dissent in SAF-controlled areas highlights governance deficits: Protests there increasingly reflect economic grievances and post-conflict vulnerabilities rather than direct frontline conflict.

In Port Sudan, [protests](#) followed the disappearance of a child from a police facility and public backlash over Argeen border fees, prompting Prime Minister Kamil Idris to [freeze](#) the fees. At the same time, university professors launched a [strike](#), while railway workers in Port Sudan and Haiya [protested](#) months of unpaid salaries and benefits. Together, these developments point to growing pressure on state-linked service delivery and employment structures, alongside rising perceptions of state institutions as extractive and unresponsive.

These pressures coincide with attempts to manage growing public dissatisfaction. Former exiled officials from the civilian transitional government [announced](#) the resumption of investigations linked to the anti-corruption and dismantling committee, four years after its suspension following the October 2021 coup. The move appears aimed at reviving transitional-era accountability while also managing domestic grievances and external perceptions. It may also reflect efforts to distance SAF leadership from Islamist-linked networks and reassert control over fragmented state-aligned

actors. However, [criticism](#) from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Revolutionary Democratic Front (SPLM-RDF) highlighted divisions within Somoud over the legitimacy and timing of such reforms during active conflict.

At the same time, coercive practices appear to be intensifying. A recent Human Rights Watch report [documented](#) killings, torture, arbitrary detention, and ethnically targeted abuses by SAF and allied actors against individuals accused of collaboration, highlighting patterns of reprisals and weak accountability in post-conflict areas.

Recent SAF leadership reshuffles—including the [appointment](#) of Yasir al-Atta as chief of staff—also point to ongoing internal reconfiguration. Although [presented as routine](#), the changes fueled speculation about broader restructuring within the Sovereignty Council and efforts to consolidate authority. The ethnic composition of the new joint chiefs of staff, dominated by officers from the Shaigiya and Ja’alin groups, also [revived criticism](#) over the continued concentration of military power among elites from the River Nile and Northern states.

Meanwhile, reports on the killing of a [jihadi figure](#) linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in South Kordofan resurfaced questions about Islamist influence within the SAF alliance following the U.S. designation discussed in Sudan Conflict Monitor [#25](#).

Regionally, SAF appears focused on reinforcing traditional alliances. [Engagement](#) with Libya’s Tripoli-based government on security coordination—likely aimed at countering Haftar’s alleged support to the RSF—alongside Burhan’s [meeting](#) with the Qatari Ambassador in Khartoum, suggests efforts to consolidate existing regional partnerships amid shifting battlefield and diplomatic dynamics.

RSF efforts to consolidate control: Recent developments suggest the RSF is focused on consolidating territorial control, expanding parallel governance structures, and sustaining operational capacity despite worsening humanitarian conditions and uneven internal cohesion.

At the political level, Tasis continues efforts to institutionalize. The [formation](#) of an Interim Judicial Council in Nyala in early April—mandated to appoint a Chief Justice, Attorney General, and Constitutional Court—signals an attempt to build a parallel legal architecture and [formalize](#) RSF-aligned governance structures. Parallel international outreach efforts also suggest ambitions for broader political recognition, although divisions within the coalition may limit them.

Governance practices in RSF-controlled areas continue to combine coercion and localized negotiation. The [detention and later release](#) of university professors in Zalingei demonstrated both the use of arbitrary detention as a control mechanism and the influence of community mediation in shaping outcomes. Authority in these areas, therefore, continues to rely on force, local bargaining, and informal arrangements rather than stable institutional systems.

On the ground, RSF consolidation appears to be linked to the expansion of military infrastructure. Reports in early April indicated that the RSF began [constructing](#) a new military airstrip in North Darfur following the displacement of local communities, likely to strengthen logistical capacity and territorial connectivity between Darfur and Kordofan.

Humanitarian and economic pressures remain acute. A [measles outbreak](#) in East Darfur has killed 70, while [water shortages](#) in North Darfur and rising food and transport costs reflect deepening vulnerabilities across civilian populations. The [depreciation](#) of the Sudanese pound against the Chadian franc following the reopening of cross-border trade further illustrates how RSF-held areas are increasingly integrated into regional economic systems, with local markets shaped by cross-border flows rather than central regulation.

These dynamics continue to reshape local alliances and conflict trajectories. Musa Hilal’s reported displacement from his North Darfur stronghold in February and [subsequent alignment](#) with SAF-affiliated actors underscore the fluidity of tribal and political alignments. Hilal reportedly persuaded RSF commander Al-Nour Ahmed Adam (“Al-Nour Guba”), from the Mahameed community, to defect to the SAF. Burhan publicly welcomed Al-Guba in Dongola despite his reported role in the siege of Al-Fasher and atrocities committed after the city’s capture in October 2025.

The SAF's embrace of defecting RSF commanders reinforces perceptions that accountability concerns remain secondary to battlefield calculations. More broadly, these developments suggest efforts by SAF-aligned actors to exploit and deepen ethnic and factional divisions within RSF ranks in ways that could further fragment the conflict landscape and fuel localized tensions.

National high school certificate exams: contesting legitimacy through service delivery

Both SAF- and RSF-aligned authorities are increasingly using service delivery—particularly education—as a tool to assert political legitimacy. The SAF-controlled government in Port Sudan [proceeded](#) with national certification exams in April 2026 under the existing Sudanese system. In an interview with STPT, the National Initiative for Saving Darfur and Kordofan Students estimated that approximately 570,000 students sat for the exams. However, around 280,000 students in Greater Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile were required to travel to SAF-held areas to participate. Only an estimated 2,000–3,000 were able to do so, with similarly small numbers accessing exam centers in neighboring countries. As a result, the vast majority of eligible students have missed this critical qualification for the third consecutive year.

Launched in February 2026 by prominent public figures and endorsed by dozens of civil society groups and media organizations, the National Initiative for Saving Darfur and Kordofan Students [appealed](#) to both SAF and RSF authorities, as well as international actors including UNESCO, UNICEF, and the UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy to Sudan, to guarantee access for conflict-affected students. Despite these efforts, authorities have not introduced alternative arrangements, leaving access to education shaped by territorial control and mobility constraints.

Meanwhile, the Tasis administration plans to organize [parallel examinations](#) in June 2026 under a [newly](#) developed framework. It has also sought recognition of its certification in neighboring countries—including Chad, South Sudan, and Kenya—to enable students to pursue educational opportunities outside Sudan.

These developments highlight the limits of parallel governance in a fragmented state. Movement restrictions, checkpoint extortion, and weak institutions in RSF-controlled areas continue to complicate exam administration. At the same time, competing certification systems risk further fragmenting Sudan's national education framework. Together, these dynamics suggest that both sides increasingly view service delivery—not only military control—as central to asserting political legitimacy, placing Sudanese youth at the center of this contest for authority.



Human Rights Developments



Impact on civilians: human rights and protection risks

Featured Analysis: Civilian Harm in Greater Kordofan: A recent investigation by Sudan Human Rights Hub (SHRH), *Under Fire: Patterns of Civilian Harm in Greater Kordofan*, highlights how the conflict's expansion into Kordofan is reshaping patterns of violence and intensifying risks to civilians. The report finds that harm to civilians is no longer confined to active frontlines but increasingly affects everyday spaces essential to survival—including markets, homes, healthcare facilities, and displacement routes.

Taken together, these findings reinforce concerns that civilian exposure to harm is becoming more systemic, extending beyond direct hostilities into the disruption of livelihoods and basic services, and underscoring the need for strengthened protection measures and accountability mechanisms.

Drone warfare and expanding civilian risk: Recent developments indicate sustained reliance on drone warfare, with both SAF and RSF using aerial strikes across dispersed fronts. Although comprehensive trend data remains limited, recent incidents suggest drone attacks continue at a high level, driving civilian harm, infrastructure damage, and disruption of essential services across multiple regions.

Attacks by both SAF and RSF illustrate a pattern of harm across both civilian and leadership targets. In White Nile State, an RSF drone strike on [al-Jabalain Hospital](#) on April 2 killed at least 10 people, including seven medical staff. This followed a SAF attack in March on Al-Daein [Teaching Hospital](#) in East Darfur that killed at least 64, underscoring the continuing targeting of healthcare infrastructure. In response to the horror, the World Health Organization (WHO) denounced the parties' total disregard for their international humanitarian law obligations barring such attacks. WHO's statement marking three years of war [verified](#) 17 airstrikes on health facilities killing at least 2,052 civilians and injuring 810.

Additional incidents include a series of SAF strikes on a [wedding](#) gathering in Darfur that killed at least 30 civilians, a [market attack](#) in Adiking that killed at least 11, and a separate paramilitary [assault](#) in central Sudan that left at least 14 dead. Furthermore, a reported SAF drone strike in Nyala also [killed](#) Usama Hassan, a senior figure in the RSF-aligned Tasis coalition, highlighting

the use of drones for targeted leadership strikes alongside broader attacks on civilian areas.

Recent SAF drone strikes on markets and mining areas suggest efforts to disrupt economic activity in RSF-controlled territories. Key incidents included the April 21 [bombing](#) of Um Dukhun market, which reportedly killed around 50 civilians, and [strikes](#) on the Sengo gold mining area in South Darfur that killed at least 14 civilians and likely targeted RSF-linked economic infrastructure tied to the sanctioned Al-Junaid Company. On April 17, the SAF also struck Adikong market near Adré, a key cross-border trade and supply hub for Darfur.

These patterns align with findings from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has reported [concern over](#) the continued use of drone attacks against civilians, particularly in Kordofan, where dozens have been killed in recent strikes.

Arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and torture: Arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and related abuses remain widespread across multiple regions, including Omdurman, Khartoum, Sinja, and Darfur. In North Kordofan, intelligence agents detained 56 women, according to a [public statement](#) by human rights defenders. An additional [20 women](#) were reported detained in El Fasher without due process, accused of looting.

Furthermore, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that approximately 11,000 individuals have been [reported missing](#) since the start of the conflict, with an increase of 40% over the past year. Detentions are frequently carried out by intelligence units affiliated with warring parties, often based on perceived affiliation or loyalty, exposing civilians—including journalists and humanitarian actors—to significant risk. Reported cases of deaths in custody and disappearances following arrest further underscore a pattern of coercive practices marked by limited oversight and accountability.

Prosecution, discrimination, and targeting identity groups: An increasing body of evidence demonstrates [patterns](#) of attacks on rights based on identity, including ethnicity and perceived political affiliation. Civilians are subjected to profiling practices and punitive measures against specific communities. In SAF-controlled areas, [demolition campaigns](#)—particularly in Khartoum North (Bahri)—carried out under the so-called “Strange Faces” law appear to disproportionately affect marginalized groups, raising concerns of collective punishment and discriminatory enforcement.



Humanitarian Developments



Humanitarian conditions :Access constraints, protection risks, and funding gaps

Access constraints and the politicization of aid corridors: The [extension](#) of the Adre border crossing through June preserves a critical humanitarian lifeline into Darfur and Kordofan. However, the corridor remains heavily politicized. The SAF-aligned government previously [closed](#) Adre for six months in 2024, while Chad temporarily [shut it](#) in early 2026 after fighting spilled across the border. In March 2026, Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minawi [called](#) for replacing the crossing, alleging it was being used by the RSF and the UAE for military purposes. Humanitarian actors warned that alternative routes would sharply increase costs in an already underfunded response. These disputes highlight how humanitarian corridors are increasingly embedded in the conflict's military and political dynamics. Aid routes such as Adre are no longer only logistical lifelines, but also sites of strategic competition, undermining neutrality, predictability, and sustained access.

At the same time, fighting around the Dilling–North Kordofan road underscores the fluid and contested nature of control over key supply corridors, while tensions in areas such as Kauda reflect the overlap between local conflict dynamics and broader territorial competition.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), insecurity, attacks, and damage to infrastructure continue to [restrict](#) humanitarian access, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan.

Localized crises: water scarcity and disease outbreaks: Across Darfur, humanitarian pressures are intensifying at the local level. In East Darfur, a [measles outbreak](#) in Labado has killed at least 70 people and infected hundreds, while the SAF Federal Ministry of Health announced the recording of active [trachoma, and infectious eye disease, cases](#) in East and Central Sudan. Beyond Darfur, the essential services continue to erode. A late March report by Radio Dabanga reported that the collapse of the health system has forced civilians to travel [hundreds of kilometers](#) to northern Sudan to access basic care. These trends reflect the convergence of displacement, environmental stress, and weakened health systems.

Furthermore, in Khartoum and other areas, [seasonal rains](#) have exposed human remains and unexploded ordnance, [underscoring](#) contamination risks. According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), these [hazards](#) continue to restrict movement, delay returns, and hinder humanitarian access.

Displacement, regional spillover, and protection risks: Displacement continues across multiple regions. In [Blue Nile](#), [tens of thousands](#) have fled recent offensives towards Damazin and Roseires,

or across the [border](#) into Ethiopia.

Child protection crisis and long-term vulnerability: The humanitarian crisis in Sudan continues to disproportionately impact children, who face displacement and a lack of access to protection and basic services. On the third anniversary of the war, the UN reported that at least [42,000 unaccompanied](#) or separated Sudanese children have been recorded across Sudan and neighboring countries, with the highest concentrations in Chad and Ethiopia. These children are exposed to heightened risks of recruitment by armed groups, child labor, forced marriage, and exploitation, alongside severe psychological trauma and limited access to care. On the same occasion, Save the Children UK reflected on the consequences for children, noting that Sudan has become the largest [child displacement](#) crisis globally and that more than half of Sudanese children have missed between 15 and 18 months of schooling as a result of the conflict. These dynamics indicate that children are not only among the most affected groups but are at the center of a deepening, long-term protection crisis, with implications that extend beyond the immediate conflict into future recovery and social stability.

Response capacity and funding gaps: Humanitarian response efforts remain critically under-resourced, with the UN Financial Tracking Service (FTS) [reporting](#) that the 2026 Sudan response is only 17.8% funded. In late March, IOM [appealed](#) for \$277 million in support to sustain operations and expand cross-border assistance. Although countries [reportedly](#) pledged an additional one billion in humanitarian funding at the Berlin Conference, it is not clear how much of this is actually new and what will actually be delivered, but even if it were all received, it would leave a gap of 1.8 billion according to FTS.



Economic & War Economy Dynamics



Survival under pressure: war economy and daily life

Since the outbreak of war in Sudan in 2023—now entering its fourth year—state institutions have been significantly weakened, the rule of law eroded, and oversight and accountability mechanisms degraded. In this environment, corruption has expanded into the everyday provision of basic services, where it is often practiced openly and normalized.

While research and media attention tend to focus on large-scale, organized corruption, everyday

“petty” practices receive far less attention, despite their structural links to broader corruption systems and their critical role in sustaining them.

This series of corruption stories seeks to address this gap by documenting and analyzing everyday patterns of corruption during the war. It aims to expose their mechanisms, highlight their risks and impacts on citizens’ lives, and challenge their normalization—contributing to future reform efforts in the post-war period.

Corruption Story No. (1): Electricity Access Corruption in Gezira State

Since the outbreak of the war in 2023, corruption has expanded and is increasingly normalized in daily life. Following SAF’s recapture of Gezira State in January 2025, temporary measures were introduced to facilitate access to electricity amid damaged infrastructure and administrative disruption. However, these measures quickly evolved into a widespread pattern of illegal electricity connections, creating an informal and unregulated system within the sector.

Electricity is now frequently accessed through unauthorized methods—locally known as “*jabadat*” and “*kabari*”¹—which bypass official contracting procedures and metering systems. Power is either diverted directly from pole-mounted junction boxes or rerouted through distribution cabinets, allowing households and businesses to receive electricity without being recorded as consumers.

Although initially driven by emergency conditions, the practice has persisted due to weak oversight and enforcement. According to interviews with confidential informants, illegal electrical cable connections cost between **SDG 200,000 and 500,000 (USD 60–150)** for households and up to **SDG 1.5 million (USD ~500)** for farms and commercial facilities. These practices are reported across the state, particularly in rural areas, and are difficult to detect without physical inspection. Economic hardship has further driven demand. Many residents, particularly returnees to Wad Madani, report that high electricity costs and deteriorating living conditions leave them with few alternatives. Some users attempt to avoid detection by maintaining minimal formal electricity credit purchases while relying primarily on illegal connections, reflecting the growing normalization of these practices.

Efforts to address the issue have been largely ineffective. While enforcement campaigns have been conducted, sources indicate that some inspection teams overlook violations or temporarily remove illegal connections in exchange for payments, only for them to be reinstated later. This reflects a broader pattern of weak accountability and embedded incentives for corruption within the system. The consequences are significant. Unregulated consumption places excessive strain on the electricity grid, contributing to transformer damage, unstable supply, and frequent outages. The absence of accurate consumption data further undermines effective load management and planning. Beyond technical losses, these practices deepen the electricity sector’s financial crisis, increasing operational costs at a time when locals estimate Sudan has already lost more than **70% of its generation capacity**.

Ultimately, the persistence of these informal systems not only weakens service delivery but also complicates future efforts to reform and rebuild the electricity sector. What began as a temporary response to crisis has evolved into a normalized corruption pattern—one that risks entrenching long-term structural challenges in Sudan’s post-war recovery.

1 Locally fabricated, rudimentary methods used to illegally tap into electricity networks.

International & Regional Response



International re-engagement, regional spillover, and fragmented diplomacy

Recent developments indicate cautious international re-engagement alongside deepening fragmentation in authority and political legitimacy. The [reopening](#) of UN headquarters in Khartoum and an African Union visit to [assess](#) operational return reflect renewed focus on the capital, though engagement remains centered on humanitarian response rather than political resolution. A senior United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) visit also [emphasized](#) investment in local systems, service delivery, and economic recovery, signaling growing recognition that humanitarian aid alone cannot address Sudan's structural crisis.

International engagement is increasingly occurring across multiple centers of power. The UN envoy has held [parallel discussions](#) with both Burhan and Hemedti, while RSF leadership has [called](#) for establishing UN offices in areas under its control to reinforce claims of governing authority. At the same time, SAF-aligned Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minawi [met](#) a Swiss delegation to discuss humanitarian conditions and peace efforts, highlighting the growing localization of diplomatic engagement in Sudan's fragmented landscape.

Regionally, Sudan's conflict remains deeply interconnected with neighboring states. Libya continues to [serve](#) as a key node in arms flows and military supply chains, while SAF [engagement](#) with Tripoli-based authorities reflects shifting security coordination efforts.

Egypt continues to host one of the largest populations of Sudanese refugees, but recent reporting indicates a shift toward more restrictive and securitized policies. A [recent investigation](#) by Ayin Network documents widespread arrests, detention, and deportation of Sudanese refugees—including asylum seekers—alongside increased surveillance of community spaces and homes. These developments reflect mounting pressure on host-country systems and signal a tightening policy environment that is reshaping displacement dynamics and limiting protection space for Sudanese civilians abroad.

Sudanese civilians are increasingly exposed to risks beyond national borders, including conflict spillover and regional insecurity. Recent Israeli strikes in Beirut [killed](#) two Sudanese nationals

and injured several others, underscoring the vulnerability of Sudanese communities abroad. At the same time, cross-border displacement, arms flows, and political alignments continue to link Sudan’s internal war to wider regional rivalries and instability.

At the global level, the Iran–Israel war is increasingly shaping Sudan’s operating environment. Continued instability in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted shipping routes, raised transport costs, and constrained the flow of fuel, food, and [humanitarian supplies](#) into Sudan. Aid agencies report growing logistical delays and operational costs, further straining an already underfunded humanitarian response.

Outlook: Three Years On — What Lies Ahead

Three years into the conflict, Sudan is likely to face continued fragmentation of authority, with parallel governance structures consolidating and no clear pathway to reunification. Civilian harm is expected to remain high as drone warfare, urban contamination from explosive remnants, and service collapse persist across multiple regions. The war economy—sustained by informal trade, resource extraction, and cross-border networks—will continue to incentivize conflict. Regional entanglement is deepening, linking Sudan’s trajectory to neighboring instability and external actors, while diplomatic efforts remain constrained by fragmentation among international stakeholders and limited leverage over armed actors.

