

Sudan Conflict Monitor

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People pray for the victims of a drone strike in El Obeid, Sudan, 2026 El Tayeb Siddig/Reuters

Drone Warfare, Parallel Governance, and the Battle for Western Sudan

Executive summary

The most important development in June 2026 was the escalation around [El Obeid](#). El Obeid has faced siege-like conditions for 18 months, but recently RSF has reinforced its encirclement. With drone strikes also increasing, warnings of imminent atrocities have placed North Kordofan at the center of Sudan's next major military and humanitarian crisis.

The battle for El Obeid is not only a fight for a city; the city could be a critical gateway for a renewed attack on Khartoum and would help the RSF consolidate a western Sudan bloc linking Darfur and Kordofan. For SAF, the city is important for holding its current territory and preventing Sudan's territorial division from hardening into a durable political reality.

As we have noted previously, drones are playing an increasingly critical role in the conflict, and

the way in which they are being used is also shifting. Drones are increasingly used to attack water reservoirs, electricity infrastructure, fuel systems, bridges, markets, airfields, aid corridors, and other civilian service nodes. [ACLEED's June analysis](#) shows that the SAF maintains frequent strikes against RSF positions and supply routes, while the RSF relies on less frequent but more targeted strikes against strategic infrastructure and military bases.

Sudan's war is increasingly becoming an infrastructure war. Beyond holding territory, both sides are using drones to make areas harder to govern by damaging water systems, electricity networks, bridges, markets, fuel supplies, and aid routes. The reported death of more than 1,000 civilians from drone strikes shows the direct lethality of this shift, while infrastructure attacks create wider harm by disrupting access to basic services. Separately, [UN reporting](#) has also warned of worsening civilian protection conditions, including widespread sexual violence.

Politically, the month saw continued efforts to consolidate governance and gain legitimacy on the RSF side. The RSF-linked Tasis administration is moving toward more formal governance practices, including [tax collection](#), [travel controls over civilian officials](#), [parallel high school examinations](#), [parallel monetary institutions](#), and reported [oil refining in South Darfur](#).

Thus the RSF-linked Tasis administration is not simply extracting revenue from areas under its control; it is trying to centralize and legitimize that extraction through formal governing tools. This does not mean the RSF has built a functioning state, but it does suggest an effort to give its territorial control a more administrative structure through taxation, customs collection, movement controls, fuel supply, monetary authority, and civil service pay systems.

On the SAF side, the government [continued](#) to take a hardline position that the RSF should withdraw from all cities under its control before a humanitarian truce could take effect. SAF continues to insist that recovery is underway in Khartoum and South Sudan. This creates a contradiction: SAF presents itself as the custodian of state continuity, but it continues to weaken the civilian institutions needed for a legitimate post-war transition.

Internationally, June saw increased sanctions pressure and renewed scrutiny of external enablers. The US Treasury imposed sanctions on procurement and recruitment networks supporting both warring parties, including actors linked to weapons, explosives, and foreign fighters. [The US Treasury announcement](#) and [Radio Dabanga's summary](#) point to a policy shift from sanctioning commanders alone toward targeting the logistical and commercial systems that sustain the war.

The challenge is that sanctions can disrupt specific networks without necessarily changing belligerent behavior unless they are coordinated with a broader political strategy including pressure on external patrons, tighter enforcement, humanitarian safeguards, and clear off-ramps.

The month's developments suggest that Sudan is moving deeper into a "dual war economy" phase: two military-political extractive systems, each seeking territorial depth, financial instruments, foreign backers, and coercive control over civilians.

Political and security developments



Civilians struggle to regain initiative in spite of the divisions

Civilian and political forces remained fragmented in June, despite multiple efforts to build a common anti-war or transition-oriented platform. The Quintet, that is the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Arab League, the United Nations, and the European Union (EU), convened [consultations of a wide variety of political actors](#) in Addis Ababa on June 35-. The consultations aimed to pave the way for a broader inter-Sudanese political dialogue.

The session prompted contestation, as previous dialogues have as well, over who should be included. In particular, the potential roles of the RSF and National Congress Party were contested. These disagreements reveal that Sudan's civilians remain divided over how to treat armed actors and the former regime.

The Sudanese Declaration of Principles Forces, a coalition of civilian political parties, trade unions, and independent armed groups established to end the ongoing war and facilitate a civilian-led democratic transition, announced a new [political charter](#) under the slogan "Towards Building a New Nation," aiming to restore the spirit of the Sudanese revolution and sustain peace. This initiative reflects continued civilian efforts to reclaim political agency, but its influence will depend on whether it can connect political principles to constituencies inside Sudan and communities affected by war. At the same time, divisions also emerged within the [Democratic Bloc](#), which has traditionally been sympathetic to the SAF, ahead of the Addis Ababa dialogue. Some members refused to participate, accusing organizers of engaging Tasis, with whom they [reaffirmed](#) that they will not negotiate, and not consulting sufficiently.

The National Forces Coordination, also viewed as aligned with the SAF, nonetheless [announced](#) participation in the Quintet Mechanism meetings through a delegation headed by Mohamed Sayed Ahmed Al-Jakoumi. Its participation, alongside objections from the SAF-leading actors, reflects both the crowded nature of Sudan's civilian-political landscape and the possibility of tactical hedging, whereby aligned actors keep channels open to international mediation while others maintain a public posture of rejection. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Wahid Nur (SLM-AW), on the other hand, said it would participate in the talks.

The Addis Ababa consultation itself facilitated dialogue, though it was contentious. The Advocacy Group for Peace in Sudan ([AGPS](#)) noted that the session allowed communication to be preserved despite widespread contention. One of the key needs they identified was the further development of youth engagement opportunities. The United States, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom, together with the AU, EU, IGAD, League of Arab States, and UN, issued a [joint statement](#) calling for “a rapid, time-bound civilian pathway leading to a civilian transition.” They encouraged the Quintet to continue its coordination and to do so quickly, in order to complement other negotiation initiatives.

This was pursued through the convening of the Sudanese Youth Consultations in Nairobi from June 26 to 29, 2026, bringing together eight civic, feminist, and political groups under the invitation of the “Sudanese Youth Network to End the War.” According to participants, the session sought to shift youth participation from symbolic representation to authentic political partnership in designing the transition. A Preparatory Committee for the Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue was set up to facilitate this engagement. The consultations produced a consensus-based final communiqué signed, demanding an end to the war through an inclusive process that entirely excludes the dissolved National Congress Party (NCP) and its front organizations, institutionalizing youth action through permanent coordination mechanisms, and establishing transparent, merit-based criteria to guarantee independent representation of youth, women, IDPs, and refugees. Furthermore, the attendees agreed to take greater engagement through their programming.

Another effective initiative has been the Nyon process – supported by the Swiss Foreign Ministry and Promedition – which is now regarded as the ‘backroom’ for official consultations. The Nyon forum has produced a declaration of principles in November 2024 and a roadmap for the political process in October 2025. At a meeting in June 2026, political and civil society forces agreed to form a preparatory committee to manage the political process.

These initiatives continue to feed into the Quintet, which is preparing for another consultation in late July. The success of the official track is directly linked to the informal consultations that have been taking place on the sidelines.

If the lack of clear unity is not ideal, it is worth noting that Sudan’s civilian actors are operating under extreme constraints: displacement, repression, resource scarcity, communications disruption, and pressure from armed authorities. Civilian coalitions therefore need more than consultation fora; they need protected civic space, resources, and mechanisms that connect political processes to local actors, including resistance committees, professional associations, women’s groups, emergency responders, displaced communities, and others.

Civilian fragmentation benefits both SAF and RSF. It allows the belligerents to claim that no credible civilian alternative exists, while international actors are left engaging a divided political field that cannot exert leverage. However, grassroots and smaller consultations appear to be making progress. Thus, the international community should support civilian processes and avoid rewarding elite fragmentation or creating parallel tracks that compete for recognition. Support should instead prioritize broad-based civilian coordination, transparent representation, protection for civic actors, and clear anti-war principles that reject both military rule and impunity for atrocities.

SAF signals recovery while increasing restrictions

SAF-aligned authorities used June to signal recovery and consultation, while simultaneously tightening political and administrative control. [Sudan’s Attorney General](#) called on the UN Human Rights Council to support government efforts to end the war by cutting off international support for the RSF, [citing](#) RSF crimes, a framing that positions SAF-aligned institutions as both legally complainant and sovereign representative of the Sudanese state.

In late May, Burhan’s [announced](#) preparations for a comprehensive internal political dialogue to

be held within the country and excluding those who “have the blood of the Sudanese people on their hands,” an apparent reference to the RSF. This appears intended to reinforce the SAF-aligned government’s claim that it can manage a transition from within Sudan rather than through externally mediated power-sharing with the RSF or restoring the country’s democratic transition, as a majority of civilians opposed to the war and military rule are pressing for. Yet Burhan’s later [rejection](#) of reported Bahraini



consultations, exclusion of the RSF and vow to eliminate them entirely, suggests that such a process remains subordinated to a military-victory narrative.

Confident in the steadfast, behind-the-scenes support of his Islamist allies and cadres from the former ruling National Congress Party, Burhan is also seeking backing from the political constituencies of forces fighting alongside the army. These include the Darfur movements and several leaders of eastern Sudan’s tribal groupings and militias, from whom he hopes to obtain an outright, blank endorsement to preside over a five-year transition. A token civilian cabinet would serve as a fig leaf to mask continued military domination of both governance and the national economy in the post-war period. SAF’s regional allies, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are actively supporting this scenario, as evidenced by a Saudi initiative to encourage several political factions to coalesce behind Burhan’s plan—a strategy that is also likely to be supported by Turkey and Qatar.

In another apparent effort to project administrative normalization, the Ministry of Higher Education [ordered](#) universities to return to their original licensed premises by August 1, 2026, threatening non-compliant institutions with loss of student intake rights for the 2026–2027 academic year. ***The order, however, would be unlikely to be necessary if there were public confidence in safety and reconstruction in Khartoum and risks imposing unrealistic compliance requirements on institutions still affected by insecurity, displacement, infrastructure damage, and staff shortages.***

The Sudanese Teachers Committee [protested](#) grossly insufficient wages and delayed payments. The state had postponed a compensatory school year in Gezira state due to organizational and administrative challenges, but teachers said that this was merely a symptom of widespread dysfunction. This is evidence of a lack of institutional legitimacy and an inability to deliver services in SAF-controlled areas, weakening its claim to recovery.

The Ministry of Culture and Information recently imposed [new requirements](#) on online media to obtain a government-issued electronic registration, including providing detailed information on domain registration and cyber security measures. These were rejected by the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate as a revival of Bashir-era restrictions. This suggests that what is being presented as “state restoration” is actually an effort to impose repression.

SAF’s external diplomacy also remained active, with Burhan holding [unannounced talks](#) with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in early June in Ankara, highlighting Ankara’s continuing importance to SAF’s diplomatic and military ecosystem. At the same time, European embassies [delayed returning](#) to Khartoum despite Port Sudan’s efforts to do so, indicating that international

confidence in SAF-administered Khartoum remains limited.

RSF seeks to establish governance while facing internal strain

The RSF-linked Tasis project showed signs of both administrative ambition and internal strain in June.

In June, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and Abdelaziz Al-Hilu [reportedly split](#) over who should be appointed as Chief of Staff to the opposition army to be created under the terms of the charter they signed in Nairobi creating their alliance. Each favors a candidate affiliated with his own faction. The dispute highlights the diverse interests included in the Tasis coalition and the risks of treating them as a single negotiating bloc.

In late May, the RSF-linked administration [announced](#) its intention to resume collection of taxes, including VAT, income tax, and stamp duties in Darfur and West Kordofan. In defending the move, the coalition argued that revitalization of the tax system would allow for the resumption of social services. These developments suggest that the RSF is seeking to generate centralized revenue to enable its Tasis government to deliver the essential public services that it has so far failed to provide to the population in RSF areas.

In late June, RSF imposed [restrictions](#) requiring civilian and executive officials to obtain permission before traveling outside of their areas of responsibility. The restrictions suggest growing concern over defections inside the RSF's administrative apparatus. The travel control indicates that the RSF is trying to discipline its membership.

The reported [appointment](#) of former Central Bank governor Hussein Yahya Jangoul to head a parallel central bank in Nyala adds a monetary dimension to the RSF's state-building experiment. This effort to claim fiscal authority further entrenches the *de facto* partition taking shape.

Local community leaders in South Darfur [signed](#) a social peace charter in late June intended to reduce tribal conflict and promote coexistence, an effort to respond to renewed deadly intercommunal clashes between the Salamat and Beni Helba. The two communities are among the main constituencies supporting the RSF and providing it with fighters. The implication is that RSF is trying to create parallel authority from above, without addressing their root causes, such as the disputes over communal land rights.

The RSF reportedly began [refining](#) crude oil in South Darfur using crude transported from East Darfur; if confirmed, this would mark a shift from reliance on external supply routes to localized control.

The analytical implication is that the RSF is seeking to enhance its legitimacy through recognizable governing functions: taxation, movement control, banking, fuel supply, and local mediation. There is, however, no evidence that they are any less exploitative or more rights-respecting.

Security developments



El Obeid at risk

El Obeid became the central security concern of June, with RSF pressure raising [fears of atrocities](#) similar to those seen after the fall of El Fasher. The city's importance lies in its position as a logistical hinge between Darfur, Kordofan, and central Sudan, meaning that its [fall](#) would strengthen RSF efforts to consolidate western Sudan while weakening SAF's operational capacity across Kordofan, and potentially serving as a base for further attacks on central Sudan. The media [reported](#) that the RSF deployed significant reinforcements around El Obeid amid expectations of a possible large-scale ground assault.

However, the SAF has constructed extensive physical fortifications around the city, mobilized substantial SAF units and allied paramilitaries, and upgraded its air defense and electronic jamming capabilities.

Drone strikes in the city have killed at least 45 people in the city in June. In one example, a [drone strike](#) on a funeral procession in El Obeid killed at least four people and injured several others, according to the Sudan Doctors Network and Emergency Lawyers. The strikes have interrupted electricity, damaged the capacity of hospitals, and disrupted water infrastructure. The siege conditions have raised the price of fuel and food, and many are having to [stand in line](#) for hours for water that is not even safe to drink. Hunger is an increasing concern.

The onset of the rainy season will likely freeze the status quo of the siege; the anticipated battle for El Obeid is unlikely to occur before the rains end, unless a humanitarian ceasefire preempts it. [ACLED assessed](#) that an RSF attack is likely, but a complete takeover remains difficult because SAF still retains an eastern logistical lifeline into the city.

A June 26, 2026 civil society [letter](#) to the UN Human Rights Council warned of credible risks of atrocity crimes and other serious human rights abuses, including summary executions, abductions, arbitrary detention, widespread sexual violence, ethnically motivated violence, and starvation as a weapon of war.

If the siege conditions continue, hunger and disease in the city can be expected to increase. Although a complete collapse similar to El Fasher may be less likely as analysts mentioned

above, if it were to happen, there could be mass killings similar to those that occurred when El Geneina and El Fasher fell earlier in the war. Urgent action is needed to protect civilians in the city.

Drug-trafficking networks and urban insecurity in the north

The July 14 armed clashes in Al Dabba, Northern State, offer an important indicator of the security risks created by the spread of armed criminal networks during the war. The Al Dabba Local Security Committee said the clashes took place between two groups involved in drug trafficking near the Palm Farm area west of Al Dabba market, a densely populated area, causing civilian injuries before the army, security services, and allied forces intervened and brought the situation under control. It [reported](#) about 17 killed and more than 30 civilians injured, while the [Sudan Independent](#) carried the committee's statement describing the incident as a security breakdown linked to drug-trafficking groups. The episode reflects the increasing visibility and capacity of armed trafficking networks, including in areas far from the main SAF-RSF frontlines.

The Al Dabba clashes illustrate how weakening state authority is creating space for drug-trafficking networks to expand. This makes illicit economies more visible, more militarized, and more capable of disrupting civilian life, transport routes, and local security arrangements.

Drone warfare is transforming the geography of the war

[ACLED](#) reported that both sides have adapted tactics and supply chains around drones, with SAF conducting more consistent strikes and the RSF relying on less frequent but more strategic infrastructure attacks. [Al Jazeera](#) reported, citing UN figures, that drone warfare killed more than 1,000 civilians in Sudan during the first five months of 2026.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) [reports](#) that 116 people were wounded by drone strikes around Tina, in Darfur, and treated at Tiné hospital in Chad from early May. *Drone warfare is therefore weakening the distinction between front lines and rear areas, allowing belligerents to attack infrastructure and extract costs from civilians across the country.*

Other security developments

Blue Nile State remained an active front. SAF reported the [recapture](#) of several areas in Blue Nile and the pursuit of RSF fighters toward the Ethiopian border. SAF also reported [repelling](#) repeated attacks by the RSF and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in [Qaysan](#), along Blue Nile's border with Ethiopia and other strategic areas.

Kassala State's security committee [imposed strict measures](#) to try to contain intercommunal tensions in eastern Sudan. The measures include measures against hate speech and a ban on carrying weapons in public places. The measures would appear to be an effort to control longstanding tensions in eastern Sudan, as described in previous [STPT publications](#).

Economic developments



Hardening economic partition

In June, the *de facto* economic partition deepened. Monetary policy has been contentious since 2024, when the SAF-aligned government began [issuing](#) new 500- and 1,000-pound notes and declared the old ones invalid. This caused a cash scarcity in RSF areas. The RSF took a number of [measures](#) to address this, including regulating the percentage that can be charged on cash-outs, appointing a transitional monetary council, [appointing](#) Hussein Yahya Jangoul, and establishing Future Bank. Now, apparently, new bills are [circulating](#) in Darfur, deepening Sudan's *de facto* division and suggesting a shift from informal liquidity management to an explicit claim to monetary authority.

Although the RSF has not, so far, claimed legal separation, such practical divisions in the way that the parties pay salaries, validate notes, regulate liquidity, and collect taxes, reintegration becomes more difficult.

Increasing regulation of fuel imports

Over the past few months, the SAF has increased engagement with fuel imports, first through the restriction of fuel importation to select firms. On June 15, the Central Bank [ordered](#) the Energy and Trade Ministries to require 200 kilograms of 21-karat gold as collateral for fuel import applications through the Baladna platform. This policy links fuel access directly to access to gold, privileging actors with large gold reserves, political connections, or military-commercial networks.

This treats gold as a monetary instrument, import guarantee, and gatekeeping mechanism for access to fuel and is likely to favor larger traders able to cover the fees, reinforcing opaque patronage networks and excluding smaller importers. See more detailed analysis in our monthly Economic Monitor.

The reported RSF [oil refining](#) in South Darfur points to both sides' dependence on fuel: the RSF is seeking the resource through its control of crude and refining capacity. SAF is trying to secure its supplies through formal import controls and gold collateral.

In mid-June, the SAF-aligned Council of Ministers approved the [2026 Darfur Governance Law](#), a measure required under the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement. The law emphasizes national unity, support for the armed forces, gold export protections, anti-corruption efforts, and the activation of Red Sea ports. More than a coherent economic policy for Darfur, the move appears to be a political signal: SAF is attempting to shore up its coalition with Darfuri armed movements, project continued authority over Darfur, and present itself as the only national framework capable of administering the region despite its limited control on the ground.

In early June, key government ministers [met](#) with leaders of Al Kadru Food Industries, a leader in Sudan's livestock and meat export sector which is heavily embedded within the structures of Sudan's military-commercial complex, to discuss improving meat exports to meet Saudi market requirements indicates continued efforts to revive livestock export chains despite war disruption. In addition, the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) and World Food Program (WFP) launched an \$87 million project to support Sudanese farmers, similarly reflecting efforts to preserve food production capacity amid conflict (covered in more detail in our economic brief).

Fuel, gold, currency, livestock, and agriculture should be analyzed as a single conflict-financing and survival system. Control over these sectors allows the belligerents to sustain mobility, salaries, patronage, procurement, local control, and weapons.

Corruption risks in immediate traffic settlements by Sudan's highway traffic police

Immediate traffic settlement is a simplified legal mechanism intended to reduce the burden on the courts. It allows individuals to settle alleged traffic violations that do not involve death, injury, or property damage by paying a specified fine without going to trial.

In practice, however, this mechanism has created incentives for institutional corruption within Sudan's Highway Traffic Police. A key concern is the fact that the regulation governing immediate settlements allocates 10% of proceeds to the traffic police. This has shifted the mechanism away from its original corrective purpose toward revenue generation.

According to a retired officer interviewed by STPT, traffic police leadership has set mandatory financial targets that must be met through immediate settlements. This creates a clear conflict of interest: the same body responsible for enforcing traffic rules also benefits financially from collecting settlement revenues. The source further stated that a significant share of the 10 percent allocation to the police is used as financial incentives to personnel, further encouraging personnel to pursue such settlements.

The practical effect, according to the same source, violations are alleged to further financial considerations rather than road-safety objectives. Vehicles that pay the settlement are reportedly allowed to continue using public roads without correcting the violation or being subjected to other legally required measures, such as impoundment. Additional testimony suggests that immediate settlements may deprive the state of revenues in favor of the police force. One long-distance bus driver stated that he has routinely paid SDG 5,000 (USD 1) to have a violation for failure to renew a license reclassified as a lesser violation. The original violation carries a settlement of SDG 50,000 (USD 10), while the reclassified violation carries a settlement of SDG 20,000 (USD 4). According to the driver, this practice enables operators to avoid the costs of annual license renewal and other formalities.

These practices do not appear to be isolated. A member of the Union of Transport Chambers stated that he had observed widespread corruption among the traffic police at most checkpoints on Sudan's national highways. According to him, police routinely overlook documented violations in exchange for informal payments. For example, long-distance bus drivers are fined SDG 10,000-15,000 (USD 2–2.5) for ignoring laws limiting the number of passengers. Private minibus drivers

similarly report that payments allow minibusses to transport passengers on highway routes in violation of the law. According to him, this is done through temporary movement permits that are officially intended for emergencies. Drivers reportedly pay between SDG 20,000 and SDG 25,000 (USD 5) to obtain such permits, although the official fee is SDG 15,000 (USD 2.5). The driver also reported additional payments at some highway crossing points, ranging from SDG 2,000 to SDG 3,000, equivalent to approximately half a dollar.

The transformation of immediate traffic settlements from a rapid punitive mechanism into a revenue-collection tool reflects a structural flaw in the system. It undermines the purpose for which the mechanism was established, creates incentives for corruption, threatens road safety, and encourages repeated violations. It also rewards non-compliant operators by narrowing the cost difference between compliance and unlawful conduct, disadvantaging operators who follow the rules and undermining fair competition.

This piece is part of a series documenting everyday corruption during Sudan's war, examining how weakened institutions, declining oversight, and the erosion of the rule of law have enabled corrupt practices to become embedded in daily life. By focusing on often-overlooked forms of corruption, it highlights their role in sustaining broader systems of abuse and impunity.

Humanitarian developments



Aid access as a tactical concession, not a protected system

In late June, the SAF-aligned government's three-month extension of [the opening](#) of the Adré border crossing with Chad for three months until September 30, 2026, allowed humanitarian aid deliveries into western Sudan to continue. The UN [welcomed](#) the extension while continuing to warn that escalating violence around El Obeid was complicating humanitarian response. Continual short-term extensions are tactical, seeking to inflate the importance of the SAF-aligned government and garnering good will while doing little to address other obstacles such as direct attack, administrative obstruction, or local armed interference. Despite the obstacles, the UN reported that [aid delivery continued](#) in several parts of Sudan, including South Kordofan and Blue Nile, despite ongoing conflict. This underscores both the persistence of humanitarian operations

and the unstable environment in which they function.

Intercommunal fighting causes displacement

South Darfur’s intercommunal violence between the Beni Halba and the Salamat (described in the security section above) displaced more than 13,000 people in one week between May 30 and June 4, according to [reporting citing](#) International Organization for Migration (IOM) figures. The displacement highlights how local conflicts are increasingly folded into the national war, with civilians forced to flee violence that is both communal and shaped by the broader militarized environment.

Sexual exploitation by humanitarians uncovered

The Associated Press (AP) [reported](#) on a 2024 Doctors Without Borders (MSF) internal report that identified 59 cases of abuse and sexual exploitation by some of its local and security staff working with refugees in Chad. MSF told AP that it has since dismissed the perpetrators and strengthened recruitment vetting and complaint systems. This is analytically important because it shows that protection risks are not limited to armed actors; humanitarian systems themselves require stronger safeguarding, accountability, and survivor-centered mechanisms.

Seizing on the AP reporting, the RSF-aligned Tasis government [suspended](#) the operations of MSF-France in its areas, pending the findings of a newly established fact-finding committee tasked with investigating the 2024 events. The Tasis government claimed it acted “to protect the dignity of the Sudanese people and strengthen accountability.” However, the suspension threatened to disrupt critical operations at a 200-bed MSF hospital in Tawila. Located in an area controlled by Abdelwahid Nour’s SLM faction, this hospital serves tens of thousands of survivors of the mass atrocities perpetrated by the RSF when they seized the town. This shows how serious concerns can be exploited to adversely affect the population.

Stabilization efforts launched

In early June, Sudan’s Ministry of Health [approved](#) a \$139 million plan to combat malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV over three years, which has now been submitted to international donors for support. IGAD also [pledged](#) \$1 million to support regional Ebola response efforts, including surveillance, health data sharing, and tighter border controls. These measures show the growing overlap between conflict response and regional public-health preparedness.

The [launch](#) of the Regional Women-Led Organizations Support Platform for the Sudan crisis created a coordination mechanism for women-led groups from Sudan and neighboring countries. Locally rooted and women-led humanitarian structures are increasingly necessary as formal aid systems struggle with failures in access, security, and protection.

Aid should be negotiated as part of a protected humanitarian system, rather than allowing belligerents to make temporary concessions for political gain. This requires monitoring routes, protecting local responders, preventing drone attacks near aid corridors, and strengthening safeguarding systems inside humanitarian operations.

Human rights developments



The June human rights picture points to a deeper problem: in many areas of Sudan, violence is not only a battlefield tactic, but a mode of governance and social control. Detention, disappearance, sexual violence, deaths in custody, extortion, and atrocity-risk conditions are increasingly part of how armed actors discipline communities, punish perceived opponents, extract resources, and shape territorial rule.

OHCHR report highlights serious abuses

On June 23, 2026 [OHCHR released a major report on](#) sexual violence throughout the first three years of the war. The report documented and analyzed 546 verified [incidents](#) of conflict-related sexual violence across 16 of Sudan's 18 states, affecting at least 838 victims, while warning that underreporting means the real scale is likely significantly higher. The report highlights key trends, with sexual violence moving with the conflict early in the war; being normalized, spreading geographically, being and involving more perpetrators in the second phase and being used in pursuit of territorial control in the third phase. The report also highlights various types of abuse including rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, and others.

Survivor testimonies further illustrate how sexual violence is intertwined with abduction, ransom, exploitation, and civilian terror. [AP testimonies](#) from three women described kidnapping, abuse, ransom, and exploitation by RSF fighters, highlighting how sexual violence can function not only as individual abuse, but as a method of coercion, social rupture, and economic predation.

Deaths in detention

Detention-related violations also remained a major concern. The most serious reported development were the [deaths](#) of more than 215 civilians in RSF-run Daqris Prison in South Darfur during May and June. According to the Sudan [Doctors Network](#), the deaths were linked to disease, torture, mistreatment, and detention conditions lacking basic healthcare and human dignity. The same reporting raised concern over the fate of 31 detainees, including children, who were reportedly transferred to a hospital in Nyala despite showing no apparent illness.

These ongoing violations show how human rights abuses are used for coercive control.

Armed actors are using detention, sexual violence, disappearance, deprivation, and civilian intimidation to govern through fear, fragment communities, and consolidate authority. These violations are leaving deep scars that will need to be addressed in a peace framework. Protection monitoring, detention access, survivor-centered sexual violence response, local justice mechanisms, and accountability for atrocity crimes must be treated as core political issues, not secondary concerns.

International developments



Sanctions expand

June saw a more developed international focus on the networks sustaining Sudan's war. In late June, the United States [imposed sanctions](#) targeting procurement and recruitment networks that support both warring parties, including Target Multiactivities Company Ltd., controlled by the already sanctioned DIS, and Colombian recruitment networks reportedly recruiting mercenaries for the RSF. The US Treasury described the designations as aimed at networks worsening Sudan's civil war and humanitarian crisis. [Radio Dabanga](#) reported that the targeted actors were linked to weapons, explosives, foreign fighters, and aviation restrictions. This marks an important shift from symbolic commander sanctions toward network sanctions. The [earlier](#) US Treasury action sanctions against alleged Colombian mercenaries had already signaled growing attention to foreign fighter pipelines.

In a further post-period development, on 13 July the Council of the EU strengthened its Sudan sanctions regime by [introducing sectoral measures](#) targeting the gold trade. The measures prohibit the purchase, import, or transfer of gold originating in Sudan, as well as the sale, supply, transfer, or export of mercury and cyanide to Sudan, with related technical, brokering, and financial services also restricted. The decision reflects growing international recognition that gold has become a key source of revenue sustaining the conflict, and that sanctions must increasingly target the commodity systems that finance the war, not only individual commanders or procurement networks.

Effective sanctions must move from actor-based listings to ecosystem disruption. This requires mapping procurement corridors, aviation brokers, payment systems, shell companies, gold and fuel traders, border militias, and logistics operators that allow both belligerents to sustain military operations.

Regional spillover intensifies

Regional spillover intensified across Sudan's borders. In mid-June, Chad [closed](#) the Sudanese consulate in Abéché and expelled diplomatic staff, reflecting worsening bilateral tensions and the sensitivity of eastern Chad as both a refugee-hosting area and a borderland linked to Darfur's conflict economy. Similarly, the Sudanese border with the Central African Republic (CAR) also grew more volatile after attacks on Sudanese civilians and Seleka [seized](#) Am Dafuq, underscoring the danger that Sudan's war could interact with pre-existing conflict in CAR.

[Reports](#) of Egyptian operations affecting Sudanese miners near the Sudan-Egypt border show how gold-bearing borderlands are becoming increasingly militarized and politically sensitive. Furthermore, the Egypt-Ethiopia [rivalry](#) over the Nile and Red Sea is also shaping the wider regional environment in which Sudan's war is unfolding.

An early-July [Africa Confidential](#) analysis, building on late-June developments, sharpened concerns that Libya has become a rear base for RSF training, logistics, and weapons flows through networks linked to Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army. The timing complicates Washington's regional posture: on June 29, US Secretary of State [met with Saddam Haftar](#) in Washington to discuss Libya's political and military unification, even as reporting indicated that Haftar-linked [support networks](#) were supporting the RSF. The indicates that US leverage over Sudan may be constrained by its Libya policy: pressing for accountability becomes harder when the same actors are being courted as partners in a US-backed Libya settlement.

Saudi Arabia's [reported](#) efforts to quietly assemble a civilian base around Burhan indicate that regional actors are not only mediating the conflict but also shaping possible political configurations around the warring parties.

These developments indicate that Sudan's conflict is taking place in an increasingly tense regional space, indicating the need for regional stabilization.

