By Suliman Baldo
The SAF’s Defense Industries System (DIS), formerly the Military Industrial Corporation, is positioning itself to dominate Sudan’s post-war economy by capitalizing on the anticipated reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure destroyed during the conflict. Sudan’s military has long dominated the economy, with the military having monopolized 82% of the state’s budgetary resources as acknowledged by the transitional government’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in 2020. However, they now appear to see post-war reconstruction as an opportunity to rehabilitate and extend their chokehold on the national economy.
The war has devastated Sudan’s industrial infrastructure—both public and private—with the private sector bearing the brunt of the destruction. Just as centering civilian voices is crucial for charting a political path free from the cycles of conflict that have plagued the nation, placing the private sector at the heart of post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction projects is vital for breaking free from the military’s economic grip and dominance. For post-war reconstruction and for laying the foundations for sustainable development to take root, the private sector must lead the rebuilding efforts, reversing the systematic destruction caused over the past eighteen months by the military and security apparatus, and its monstrous creation, the RSF. Civilian technical line ministries, such as the ministries of Health Energy, and Agriculture, must also play leading roles free from the dominance of military and security systems of control over revenue-generating activities of the state. This objective can only be achieved by restoring to the state’s institutions of oversight and control, such as the Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Chamber, and the Judiciary, their full authority under national laws.
Such medium and longer-term measures are needed as SAF appears to be already channeling the limited international economic support dispensed by Sudan’s international partners through its own corporate holdings or public entities under its full control. During Burhan’s September visit to China, nearly all of the agreements signed were between DIS holding companies and Chinese firms. The most significant was the “strategic cooperation agreement” between DIS and China’s Polytechnologies, which is likely to rebuild DIS’s weapons manufacturing capacity. SAF will probably prioritize purchasing weapons and munitions from China over longer-term post-war rehabilitation projects.
According to the pro-SAF newspaper Al-Karama (“Dignity”), the DIS Energy and Mining Cluster also signed an agreement with companies affiliated with China Energy to develop nuclear energy facilities and rebuild ports and airports. Additionally, the DIS Mining and Energy Cluster secured agreements with China Communications Construction Company Global (CCCCG) for the rehabilitation of Sudan’s electricity infrastructure. The signing was presided over by DIS CEO Lt.-Gen. Mirghani Idris and Minister of Energy and Oil Badr Eldeen El-Feel.
Al Karama also reported that GIAD Engineering Group, another DIS entity, signed agreements with several Chinese auto-manufacturing companies to produce electric cars, trucks, and other machinery in Sudan. Meanwhile, the Exports Development Group, a DIS holding company, secured an agreement with the AHCOF International Development Co. to advance Sudan’s agricultural sector. At the signing, AHCOF International’s CEO emphasized that the company is one of Sudan’s largest importers of oil seeds.
However, whether the cash-strapped government in Port Sudan can honor its commitments under these agreements remains uncertain. Sudan already owes China approximately $11 billion from oil investments, and the destruction of the pipeline and the Khartoum Refinery war will likely add to Sudan’s debts as further.
For Port Sudan authorities, the straightforward solution to resolving their predicament lies in encouraging Chinese gold-producing companies that left Sudan after the war to return and increase production. The Director of Sudan’s Mineral Resources Company, under the Ministry of Minerals, assured the association of Chinese mining companies that their investments in Sudan would be fully supported and protected. He also announced from Beijing the return of one of the largest Chinese companies in the gold mining sector to Sudan. However, the environment of insecurity is likely to cause hesitation.
As SAF seeks to set up its economic future by courting Chinese, and to a lesser extent Russian, partners, there is a closing window to intervene to prevent this. At the national level, some of the mechanisms that could be employed include:
- Monitoring and reporting on these efforts by independent media, civil society organizations, and anti-corruption watchdogs.
- Conducting public education activities to enhance public understanding of the detrimental impact of such positioning and efforts to capture national resources.
- Professional workers’ associations should closely monitor new reconstruction contracts involving entities controlled by the warring parties and private Sudanese and foreign enterprises, ensuring compliance with Sudanese laws and adherence to best practices.
The international community can support these efforts by:
- Continuing efforts to sanction military companies, which can limit their ability to profit from the destruction that they themselves have wrought.
- Conducting regular monitoring to understand how the military is adapting to these sanctions, including by creating new companies and finding new intermediaries to help them to circumvent the measures and adopting additional mechanisms as needed.
- Including enhanced due diligence measures in post-war financing arrangements to ensure that military companies are not able to benefit and that the infusion of resources rather helps to reinvigorate and revitalize Sudan’s battered private sector and reformed public sector entities that are free from dominance by the military and security agencies. The engagement of the latter will ultimately be needed for the rebuilding of what the war has destroyed and for the revival of the Sudanese economy which the war has brought to its knees.
Suliman Baldo is the founding director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker. He has previously worked for The Sentry, the Sudan Democracy First Group, the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Human Rights Watch (HRW).
In addition to working with NGOs, Baldo has served as a Commissioner on the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Côte d’Ivoire (2011) and the UN’s Independent Expert on human rights in Mali (2013-2017).
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