Dr. Elwathiq Kameir
Dr. Kameir is a freelance researcher and political analyst. He is a former University of Khartoum professor and Senior Program Specialist at the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). He is prolific and influential commentator on Sudanese current affairs.
The SAF-aligned government of Sudan has expressed concern about participating in the Geneva negotiations. The government has made its participation contingent on a number of conditions that are unlikely to be fulfilled without further bilateral talks with the US administration, specifically: (1) implementation of the Jeddah Declaration commitments, (2) insisting on the exclusion of the UAE and IGAD, and (3) seeking to resume the Jeddah platform. In addition, there have been concerns about the construction of the government delegation.
These concerns, as will be discussed below, do not justify undermining the hopes of the Sudanese people for an end to the conflict.
Progress in Interactive Dialogue
The report by the head of the negotiating delegation, Minister Bashir Abou Namou, on the bilateral talks in Jeddah between the Sudanese government and the US administration helps us to understand the government’s position and presents a picture of fruitful engagement.
The Sudanese delegation presented six concerns to the US Envoy, including those related to the preconditions and a few others. The delegation head’s report described positive and detailed responses from the head of the US delegation, Special Envoy Tom Perriello. According to the report, the US expressed opposition to “the RSF’s presence or a political role for it in Sudan’s future. The future of Sudan will be determined by the Sudanese people, who completely reject the RSF.” The US also condemned the RSF atrocities and violations, which have led to U.S. sanctions on some RSF members. The report indicates that the “US does not place the RSF on the same moral and legal footing as the Sudanese Armed Forces, and the potential Geneva talks will not legitimize the RSF.” The report further cited seven gains for the Sudanese government that came from the bilateral talks, including US recognition of General Al-Burhan as the President of the Sovereignty Council and the Head of State, not just as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
Ironically, despite all these positive aspects of the interactive dialogue identified by the head of the delegation himself, the report continues to articulate the preconditions noted above. Nonetheless, the talks offer an opening for further dialogue that should continue to build trust and attempt to establish stable bilateral relations between Sudan and the United States, on which the future of the talks hinges.
However, there is a need to engage with the government preconditions specifically and to lay out why these should not obstruct talks:
1- Implementing the Jeddah Declaration
The government of Sudan has argued that negotiations should not proceed as long as the commitments of the Jeddah declaration are not fully implemented. According to the government delegation’s report, the U.S. Special Envoy completely agreed “with us on the importance of implementing the Jeddah Declaration”. Therefore, going to Geneva does not in any way contradict the demand for the withdrawal of RSF forces from civilian homes, landmarks, and civil facilities. However, it is unrealistic to expect this to be accomplished before further negotiations. Which indeed is why it is vital for the government to participate in negotiations in Geneva, which as the US notes, will focus on how to implement the Jeddah Declaration.
Indeed, the Sovereignty Council already laid out a road map for this in July 2023. The first phase focuses on the separation of forces while the second focuses on humanitarian aid. This could be the basis for future negotiations. It is in Sudan’s best interest for the government to attend the negotiations, provided that the US and its mediation partners, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland, announce that the sole agenda item in Geneva is negotiating the implementation of Jeddah through the first phase of the government’s plan. The second phase, concerning the provision of aid, would follow.
2 – Exclusion of the UAE and IGAD
In my opinion, the presence of the UAE as an observer does not harm Sudan in any way. Indeed the UAE remains accused of it role in fueling the war by supporting the RSF, making it a stakeholder.
The Geneva negotiations are not the venue for resolving bilateral relations with the UAE, nor do they require the government to cease its efforts to draw attention to, and ultimately end the UAE’s role, nor cease demanding that it bear the lion’s share of compensation for war damages and reconstruction. Far from it, talks in Geneva are an opportunity to alert the U.S. to the real danger posed by covert UAE support for the RSF to the security and stability of Sudan and the entire region. They are also an opportunity to exert pressure on the UAE, in the presence of the entire international community.
Furthermore, the inclination to boycott the Geneva platform seems inconsistent with the government’s previous acceptance of the UAE’s direct participation in the Manama talks last February, although these were not publicly announced. Second, it seems incompatible with the continuation of diplomatic relations between Sudan and the UAE more than 16 months after the outbreak of the war, with accredited ambassadors carrying out their usual duties. Why should the presence of a former participant in talks and a country with whom the government is maintaining relations be unacceptable? From another angle, the UAE has been Sudan’s primary gateway for foreign trade since the 1990s, following U.S. sanctions. Even after the war, Sudanese gold exports to the UAE (through El Nilein Bank Abu Dhabi) have continued.
As for IGAD, it was not mentioned in the original US invitation to the negotiations. It was likely suggested by the US delegation based on its previous role in negotiations, but it seems content to be represented by the AU. In our opinion, IGAD has no relevance in the talks, as the “Sudanese-Sudanese” dialogue is now in the hands of the African Union, which began its work with a preparatory dialogue in mid-July.
3 – Shifting the Negotiation Venue from Jeddah to Geneva
What is the problem with the negotiations being held in Geneva instead of Jeddah? In my opinion, the negotiation venue is not defined by the location but by the agenda and the issues to be discussed, especially since the US Special Envoy confirmed to the government delegation that the Geneva negotiations would be an extension of the Jeddah talks. If the Geneva meeting will discuss military matters and not the political process, as stated in the Jeddah Declaration, where is the problem? Furthermore, the Cairo Conference of Political and Civil Forces, held on July 6, emphasized the need to adhere to the Jeddah Declaration and consider mechanisms for its implementation and development to keep pace with the evolving war situation. The Geneva meeting is well-positioned to consider these mechanisms.
4- The Nature of the Government’s Negotiating Delegation
Another point of contention between the Sudanese government and the US is the American administration’s request that the government’s negotiation team should be led by a high-ranking military officer fully authorized to make decisions. The US is seeking high-level representation from all the partners involved, and this applies equally to the SAF.
In my view, this issue can be resolved by offering practical suggestions that include both military and non-military leaders. Indeed we could draw on the experience of the negotiations between the former regime and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) at which the government delegation was led by the Secretary-General of the ruling party, while the military negotiations were led by the Chiefs of Staff from both sides. In the second phase, which is to focus on issues of humanitarian aid, subject matter experts may be integrated into the delegation. It could also be seen as inconsistent for the government to oppose having a military commander lead the negotiation delegation in Geneva given that the government’s delegation in Jeddah was led by Major General Mahgoub Bushra and the Rapid Support Forces’ delegation was headed by Brigadier General Omar Hamdan, both army officers.
In conclusion, the government’s rejection of participation in the Geneva negotiations does not serve the interests of Sudan and the Sudanese people, whose hopes are tied to ending the war and returning to their homes. The government should leverage the achievements and gains from the interactive dialogue—as outlined in the head of the delegation’s report—that it may lose by boycotting the upcoming negotiations. Such a refusal implicitly rejects American mediation, which has been elevated by the direct involvement of the Secretary of State, the White House’s engagement, and the appointment of a special envoy by the President. This could damage the government’s credibility. So, is alienating the US and other international community stakeholders truly in the country’s best interest?
