Elwathig Kameir
Toronto, January 27, 2025
Some friends ask me: What impact will U.S. sanctions against the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have on the state of war in the country? In turn, I asked, searched, and left no stone unturned to provide an objective answer and offer an analysis of the nature and extent of this impact—who it affects and how the government will address it.
In my brief analysis, I believe these sanctions will neither alter the course of the war nor bring it to an end. Given their personal financial nature, I do not think they will have a tangible impact on the economic situation. Rather, their main effect will be on Sudan-U.S. bilateral relations and Sudan’s relations with the international community more generally.
The decisive factor in ending the war depends on the balance of military power between the army and the militia on the ground. The war between the Sudanese Army and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army did not stop until both sides reached the realization that, as the Sudanese say, “A third of the wealth is better than losing it all.” That is, both sides understood that achieving peace was better than continuing the conflict. This only occurred in 2005, despite fact that heavy U.S. sanctions were imposed on Sudan’s Islamist regime in its early years. Sudan was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993, and faced further economic sanctions in 1997, alongside a significant downgrading of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Experience has shown that sanctions are largely ineffective—aside from their temporary symbolic impact—especially after the previous Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted their failure to stop the war and expressed his regret. In addition, many politicians and analysts believe these sanctions will harm U.S. interests more than they benefit them. The sanctions could give the Sudanese government more leeway to sidestep American maneuvers and focus on securing military victories, by providing a basis to rally domestic public opinion. Additionally, they may undermine the credibility of any U.S.-led mediation efforts and could even strengthen the position of the army commander rather than weaken him, potentially turning him into a national hero around whom large segments of the population rally.
Sanctions: Do They Put the Army and the RSF on Equal Footing?
To begin with, the U.S. decision to impose sanctions on the Commander in Chief of the SAF was not surprising; it was expected to follow soon after sanctions were imposed on the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on January 8, 2025. The lack of strategic depth in U.S. policy aiming to end the war has led it to apply sanctions as a set targeting both the army and the RSF simultaneously, viewing them as “two warring parties.” Since late May 2023—less than six weeks after the war broke out—the U.S. administration has imposed economic sanctions on both sides, including visa bans and restrictions on companies affiliated with them. These measures continued throughout 2024. As such, every action taken against the RSF has been followed by a corresponding action against the army. Thus, when sanctions were imposed on Hemedti, it was clear to everyone that Burhan would be next.
While this U.S. policy holds both the army and the RSF responsible for the continuation of the war, it does not equate them in terms of the nature and gravity of the crimes committed. On December 6, 2023—a day after the collapse of the Jeddah negotiations—U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken accused both the army and the RSF of committing war crimes. However, the RSF was singled out for committing crimes against humanity and engaging in “ethnic cleansing”.
During the first meeting between the Sudanese government delegation and U.S. Special Envoy Tom Perriello in Jeddah on August 9, 2024—on the subject of the U.S. invitation to Geneva negotiations—the Sudanese delegation expressed concerns about the U.S. stance on the future of the RSF in Sudan’s military and political landscape. One of the key takeaways highlighted in the detailed report by the head of the Sudanese delegation, Dr. Bashir Abu Nimmo, was securing a U.S. acknowledgment of the distinction between the SAF and the RSF both in the law and in terms of legitimacy. According to Abu Nimmo, the envoy explicitly stated that he “fully supports this position and is designing the process to ensure that the RSF does not expand its operations in a way that suggests it is winning. The U.S. does not want the RSF to have a political role in Sudan’s future. Sudan’s future will be determined by the Sudanese people, who completely reject the RSF.” He further clarified that the U.S. does not place the RSF on the same legal and moral standing as the SAF and that the Geneva talks, if they occurred, would not grant any legal status to the RSF.
Several developments reinforce the notion that the U.S. administration does not view the army and the RSF as equals:
1. Even after bilateral talks between the U.S. and Sudanese delegations —which the U.S. had hoped would break the deadlock—failed and the Sudanese government and army refused to participate in the Geneva negotiation the envoy continued to engage with the Sudanese government. He made significant efforts to obtain security clearance to enter Port Sudan and meet the army commander in his capacity as Chairman of the Sovereignty Council. This meeting eventually took place on November 18, 2024.
2. During his conversation with Burhan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (September 24–28, 2024), the envoy explicitly stated that the U.S. does not see a political future for the RSF and does not equate it with the national army. He backed up his words with action, visiting Port Sudan less than two months later to meet with the army chief and the head of the Sovereignty Council.
3. Although the envoy met with the RSF’s negotiating delegation, he never sought a direct meeting with Hemedti throughout his nearly year-long tenure—despite his role as a mediator, which would typically require engagement with all key parties to the crisis.
4. The envoy met with a broad spectrum of Sudanese political, community, and tribal leaders in Port Sudan and across regional capitals, consistently reiterating the U.S. stance that the RSF is not considered on equal footing with the Sudanese army.
5, In his engagements with U.S. policymakers and civil society, the envoy reiterated particularly strong statements in his final days in office. In a farewell event at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington on January 16, he addressed an audience of U.S. officials and thought leaders, stating:
“If you look at a year ago, the RSF was probably at its peak of perceived legitimacy. It had dominated on the battlefield and it started to establish a momentum where there was some move to start saying, hey, maybe we need to recognize these guys. He gets his tour, being greeted almost like a head of state in the area. And if you move that forward a year later, we moved the sanctions up into the family, across the brothers, up to Hemedti, designated this as genocide, started to go after some of the procurement companies. And I think one thing that should never be negotiable in this is any legitimacy and ruling legitimacy of the RSF. And I think that’s been appreciated by Sudan.”
Therefore, when conducting an objective assessment of the gravity and implications of the sanctions imposed on the Commander in Chief of the SAF compared to those previously imposed by the same U.S. administration on the leader of the RSF, a fundamental distinction and a wide disparity between the two become evident. In terms of the gravity of crimes committed during the war, genocide is considered the most serious, followed by crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture.
The sanctions against the army chief are based on allegations of targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, obstructing humanitarian aid, and refusing to participate in U.S.-led negotiations in August of the previous year. Some of these actions are classified as war crimes, which are generally seen to be lower on the gravity scale of international humanitarian law violations. In contrast, the primary basis for sanctions against the RSF leader is the U.S. administration’s determination that the RSF and its allied factions committed genocide in Sudan. According to the U.S. Secretary of State, RSF forces “continued attacking civilians, killing men and boys based on their ethnicity, and deliberately targeting women and girls from specific ethnic groups for rape and other forms of sexual violence.”
Furthermore, the U.S. Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions against the RSF leader extended to seven companies funding him and supplying his forces with weapons. These sanctions also included freezing all assets and interests of the designated entities, whether located in the United States or controlled by U.S. persons. Perhaps most significantly, the sanctions barred the RSF leader and his family from traveling to the US, whereas the measures against the army chief did not impose any restrictions on his international movements.
As a result, reactions to these sanctions should not be based on populist rhetoric that focuses solely on mobilization, denunciation, and condemnation simply because sanctions were imposed on the army chief in the same manner as the RSF leader. The two cases differ in both nature and severity. During its early years, the former Inqaz regime in Sudan adopted this type of rhetoric in resisting U.S. sanctions, driven by ideological hostility toward the West—exemplified by outdated slogans such as “America’s punishment is near.” These knee-jerk reactions often accompany calls for Sudan to align itself with international blocs opposed to the U.S. and the West, advocating for a pivot toward Russia. (One only needs to recall what Bashar al-Assad ultimately gained from his alliance with Russia.) Why must Sudan choose between the two powers? Why not maintain relationships with both the U.S. and Russia, defining these relationships based on Sudan’s national interests rather than aligning with either camp?
Ironically, after facing increasing turmoil following South Sudan’s secession, Sudan’s defunct regime later shifted its approach, seeking to restore relations with the U.S. through diplomatic engagement. Beginning in late 2014, the Sudanese government initiated two negotiation tracks with the U.S. administration to address contentious issues (five key issues were identified) that had led to the imposition of economic sanctions. The goal of the first track was the eventual lifting of these sanctions. In line with this effort, President Obama issued an executive order in January 2017, just before leaving office, revoking President Clinton’s 1997 trade and financial sanctions order. The Trump administration later confirmed the lifting of these sanctions through a new executive order in October 2017, finding that progress cited in the Obama order had been maintained.
The second track of negotiations also focused on five contentious issues: public freedoms, religious freedoms, relations with North Korea, humanitarian work, and outstanding U.S. lawsuits against Sudan (including the in relation to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa and the USS Cole attack). The ultimate goal of this track was Sudan’s removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Although negotiations had made significant progress, they were disrupted by the December 2018 revolution, prompting the Trump administration to suspend talks in February 2019. However, the understandings reached during these discussions paved the way for Sudan’s transitional government—largely with the same negotiating team—to conclude these issues and secure Sudan’s removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list in mid-December 2020.
Conclusion
The Biden administration’s decision to impose sanctions on both the leader of the RSF and the Commander in Chief of the SAF just two weeks before the end of its term—particularly its determination that the RSF’s actions constitute “genocide”—amounts to passing the hot potato to the incoming Trump administration. Based on various statements from Republican leaders, including the new Secretary of State, it appears that the Trump administration will handle the issue by maintaining Biden’s stance on the RSF. Politically and morally, it would be difficult for Trump to reverse this position, especially since leading Republican figures in Congress, such as Senator Jim Risch, have been urging the administration for over a year to classify the RSF’s atrocities as genocide.
Given this context, I believe that addressing and mitigating U.S. sanctions should be pursued through political engagement and diplomatic channels. This means continuing negotiations to build trust and striving to establish stable bilateral relations between Sudan and the United States. The approach should be framed within a positive discourse, sending constructive messages to the international community in alignment with Sudan’s broader national interests.
The starting point for political engagement with the new U.S. administration should be to identify and define the core issues that will shape the future of Sudan-U.S. relations. In my view, President Trump is likely to appoint a special envoy for Sudan within the year. Some members of Trump’s previous administration with expertise in Sudan, such as Peter Pham and Tibor Nagy, may return, which could facilitate mutual understanding. This, in turn, means that Sudan’s government must develop a clear vision regarding:
1. Ending the war and addressing the role of the UAE and other countries that may be obstructing peace efforts.
2. Transitioning to civilian rule through an inclusive political process that leads to free and fair elections, as part of the agenda and roadmap for talks between both sides.
Additionally, I believe that two key concerns will shape President Trump’s approach to Sudan and determine his policies—both of which the Sudanese government must prepare to address in a way that serves its interests:
1. His strong desire to expand participation in the “Abraham Accords,” particularly since both Sudan and the UAE are already signatories. Supporting this assumption is the fact that “Project 2025,” the detailed blueprint for the Trump administration’s policies, only mentions Sudan in the context of the Abraham Accords.
2. His focus on boosting American investment in Africa, especially in fossil fuels—a sector that the Biden administration has sought to phase out in favor of renewable energy. This priority was emphasized by Trump’s incoming Secretary of State during his Senate confirmation hearing.
A third potential concern for Trump in shaping U.S.-Sudan relations may be the issue of Sudan’s ties with Russia and China amid the current geopolitical polarization—particularly regarding reports that Russia is seeking to establish a military base on the Red Sea.
