By Lutz Oette and Nada Ali
If anyone is under the illusion that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan is fighting for the liberation of Sudanese civilians from the military campaigns and atrocities of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their international backers, they need only look back to the events of 25 October 2021. Over the weekend, we marked the fourth anniversary of the coup d’état staged by the military that sounded the death knell for Sudan’s short-lived transition, which followed on from the fall of al-Bashir in April 2019. Incidentally, the city of El Fasher finally fell into the hands of the RSF on Sunday; thereby marking the consolidation of RSF territorial control over the entirety of Darfur. This is yet another turn in the current war that leads straight back to the coup and its sidelining of the civilian component of the Transitional Government. In this trajectory, the coup forms part of a violent counter-revolution uniting both belligerents as well as other allied forces and militias. This counter-revolution has also reportedly enjoyed the support of a number of regional powers that seek to constrain and weaken democratization in the region.
In the course of the coup, and after arresting the political leaders of the transition including former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, Al Burhan proceeded to declare the suspension of numerous articles of the Constitutional Declaration which had governed Sudan’s transition and guaranteed power sharing with the civilian forces. In orchestrating his shelving of civilian forces and a return to military rule mirroring that which had prevailed from April to August 2019, Al Burhan depended on the support of the RSF and its leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka Hemedti) as well as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) of Jibril Ibrahim and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) of Minni Minawi. These rebel groups benefitted from the Juba Peace Agreement of 2020. The agreement already tipped the balance between civilians and gunmen on the Sovereign Council created by the Constitutional Declaration in favor of the latter. The coup simply attempted to complete the task by vesting exclusive power in military men who continued to prove their lack of commitment to the transformative ideals of the December Revolution. It is therefore unsurprising that the devastating situation in El Fasher today is the result of the actions of all these parties whose modus operandi has consistently treated civilian lives as dispensable in the service of strategic military aims. The capture of the city by the RSF is bound to aggravate an already dire humanitarian situation in the region and is likely to result in serious violations of the human rights of the people of Darfur who have long since suffered the excesses of pernicious military and militia men.
The 2021 coup precipitated a wave of violent repression resulting in the killing and wounding of hundreds of peaceful protesters and laid the groundwork for the outbreak of the war on 15 April 2023. The war between the SAF and the RSF is a fight for power and, increasingly, legitimacy. Legitimacy for the SAF seems to hinge on the reaction of populations in parts of Sudan that were never subjected to the scourge of war nor to the extreme violence and international crimes committed by the RSF. The recent International Criminal Court (ICC) judgement in the case of ICC Prosecutor v Ali Kushayb demonstrates the fallacy of this position. While the brutality of the RSF is both acknowledged and condemned herein, the SAF, including its current leaders, were instrumental in allowing the janjaweed (which the then Al Bashir government turned into the RSF in 2013) atrocities against civilian populations in Darfur in 2003/4. In the summary of the ICC judgement, the Trial Chamber concluded that the murder, pillage, rape and forcible displacement committed against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa were conducted by the janjaweed in concert with the SAF or under its instructions and facilitated by it. It was also the conclusion of the Trial Chamber that the brutality of the janjaweed was seen as an asset since they were unconstrained by any legal or moral frameworks and could thus be unleashed on the communities to which the rebels belonged to force them to relinquish their rebellion. History for the SAF and its partners, therefore, did not start on 15 April 2023.
Whatever the problematic role played by the Arab Troika (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) in respect of Sudan, the Quad statement they produced together with the US on Restoring Peace and Security in Sudan on 12 September 2025 was not only made without the involvement of either party to the armed conflict, it also envisages a future without them. This is an important development if only to neutralize geopolitical incentives to support either party. The Quad statement therefore constitutes an existential threat for both parties. This applies particularly to the SAF and Al Burhan, which has been widely treated as Sudan’s de facto government. In contrast, the RSF’s attempt at gaining legitimacy by setting up of a government in areas under its control was emphatically rejected by the UN Security Council on 13 August 2025.
The SAF and its political allies seek to portray themselves as the country’s saviors, representing national unity. Notwithstanding some public support gained for re-capturing Khartoum and Gezira from the RSF, primarily as the “lesser evil,” the SAF and its Islamist allies stand for the opposite; namely, a legacy of decades of violence, brutal, autocratic rule, and lack of respect for the rule of law and human rights as well as a total disregard for the long-term impacts of retribalization in Darfur and elsewhere. In reality, the SAF has always been a direct threat to the wellbeing of the people of Sudan and their aspirations to live in a free, democratic and peaceful society. The coup therefore remains a critical, highly symbolic turning point in the trajectory of these events. It demonstrated that neither the SAF nor the RSF were willing to relinquish power peacefully as they prioritized their own interests over the interests, wishes and even lives of the Sudanese people and continued to use violence against civilians to entrench their control over Sudan and its resources. Politically, the stain of the coup’s illegality and its diplomatic consequences continue to cause a problem for the SAF by inhibiting its attempt to transform itself into a legitimate political actor.
The SAF has been making a concerted effort to remove this stain. One of the authors recently witnessed such an attempt when representatives of the regime claimed that the coup had not been unlawful. As a coup d’état is by definition unlawful, the only way to make such an argument is to rewrite history, claiming that what happened in October 2021 was a legitimate transfer of power or had been legitimated subsequently. It is therefore important to underscore that the coup was, and remains, unlawful, both under domestic and international law. The 2019 Constitutional Declaration set up a sovereignty council chaired by alternating members of the transitional military council and civilians selected by the Forces of Freedom and Change. The military should have handed over power in the course of 2021 pursuant to Article 11(3) of the Constitutional Declaration and its subsequent amendments, an obligation it breached when staging the coup that rendered the transfer of power impossible.
As highlighted by Sudanese lawyers and civil society groups, the coup perpetrators’ imposition of a state of emergency and suspension of several articles of the Constitutional Declaration, including Article 11, were unconstitutional. According to Sami Abdelhalim Saeed, and given the provisions of Articles 78, 25(3) and 41, there was no legal basis for the suspension of the above provisions of the Constitutional Declaration. This is because such suspension would have required the approval of both the Sovereign Council and the Transitional Cabinet. As such, in carrying out the arrests against members of the Transitional Government in October 2021, Al Burhan used his position and access to military force in violation of the Constitutional Declaration. This arguably constitutes the offence of rebellion against the Constitutional Regime under Article 164(1) of the Armed Forces Act of 2007, which provides a punishment of “death, or imprisonment, for a term, not exceeding twenty years together with the possibility of deprival of all, or part of the pension, or privileges [for] whoever does, agrees or plans with others to affect the constitutional, or security regime, or unity of the country, by use of military force, or wages war against it, or does the material, or ethical preparation therefor, or commits any acts, or does any communications, or equipages, as by nature cause the same.” As such, the 2021 coup d’état was manifestly illegal under Sudan’s constitutional, military and criminal laws.
Internationally, the coup was widely condemned. The African Union issued a communique on the situation in Sudan on 26 October 2021. Emphasizing Article 4(p) of its Constitutive Act which establishes the principle of “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments,” Article 7 (g) of its Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, it decided, “to suspend, with immediate effect, the participation of the Republic of Sudan in all AU activities until the effective restoration of the civilian-led Transitional Authority.” The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights subsequently issued several statements and resolutions in which it stressed Sudan’s obligation to respect the right of persons to participate freely in the government of their country and the right of all peoples to national and international peace and security under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The United Nations, for its part, condemned the coup but has since treated the SAF as the de facto government.
The coup was unlawful and so is the regime it ushered into power. Subsequent events, such as (partial) success on the battlefield, do not change this. Neither do the SAF’s February 2025 amendments to the Constitutional Declaration, described as giving Sudan’s military “absolute control.” These amendments are null and void because a regime that came to power by unconstitutional means has no power or legitimacy to make them. The only means by which the SAF and its political allies could become legitimate would be through free and fair elections. However, even such a theoretical pathway is highly problematic. These actors have committed serious breaches of Sudan’s constitutional order and the law. They have also committed serious human rights violations in the period from 25 October 2021 to 15 April 2023, and thereafter violations of international humanitarian law and international crimes in the course of Sudan’s armed conflict. It is for the Sudanese people, through transitional, inclusive democratic processes, to determine what consequences these breaches should have. On the face of it, as emphasized in numerous statements by civil society actors and regional and international bodies, both the SAF and RSF and their political and military associates have forfeited any right to play a part in Sudan’s political future, given their unlawful, violent, and destructive conduct.
Lutz Oette is Professor of International Human Rights Law and Nada Ali is a lecturer, both at the College of Law, SOAS, University of London.
