By Bakry Eljak Elmedni
October 15 marked 18 months since the start of the current war in Sudan. Negotiations in Geneva, jointly convened by the US and the Swiss governments, stalled due to the refusal of the armed forces to attend, leaving not a glimmer of hope on the horizon, and no light either at the beginning or the end of the tunnel. The Geneva negotiations did not succeed either in bringing the parties together, nor in reaching a ceasefire, but they succeeded in obtaining pledges from the parties to open crossings and facilitate the movement of humanitarian aid. However, they did not specify mechanisms for ensuring adherence to these commitments, as was the case with the Jeddah Declaration signed on May 11, 2023, or that they would not use relief as a political weapon.
The Geneva negotiations aspire to associate representatives of a plethora of prior unsuccessful initiatives led by the African Union, its sub-regional Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and Sudan’s neighbors, and regional powers with influence over the parties. As the war drags on, rivalries among regional powers seeking to influence its outcome by supporting their preferred local ally would make the search for a negotiated solution much harder.
As the fighting intensifies and the prospects for diplomacy diminish, efforts are underway to reconcile the views of civilians backing the armed forces with those of the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Taqaddam), which opposes the war and advocates for the revival of Sudan’s path to democratic civilian rule. A more unified civilian movement pressing for a negotiated end to the conflict could significantly enhance the likelihood of a peaceful resolution.
This article addresses three interrelated issues that have a major impact on the future of the war and the prospects for peace. The first is what can convince the Port Sudan camp to go to negotiations. The second is the escalation of fighting in areas that have witnessed fighting in the past, and the possibility of the war expanding to new areas. The last is the qualitative shift in the nature of the war and the emergence of ethnic and ideological dynamics represented by the emergence of ethnic militias and jihadist brigades among the armed forces that operate openly and do not hesitate to kill civilians.
Bringing the Port Sudan camp to negotiations
The first issue concerns the Port Sudan camp. In the past few months, it has become clear beyond any doubt that the Port Sudan camp will not go to negotiations unless one or both of two things are achieved:
- They obtain legitimacy.
- They change the dynamics of power on the ground.
The de facto Port Sudan authorities are seeking to obtain legitimacy and recognition. They have sent letters to all diplomatic missions accredited to Sudan demanding they open embassies in Port Sudan, instead of relocating them to neighboring countries and maintaining antennas in the forced search of the government. At the same time, the de facto authorities are waging a diplomatic battle through allies to unfreeze Sudan’s membership in the African Union, which was suspended in the aftermath of the October 2021 coup. Following the coup, the Armed Forces are demanding the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration as a condition for going to negotiations, and although they signed the Jeddah Declaration on behalf of the Armed Forces, they now insist on negotiating as a legitimate government. In essence, they want to have their cake and eat it too.
There is also planning to try to establish legitimacy as a fait accompli by forming a government in Port Sudan from civilian groups loyal to the National Congress Party (NCP), Sudan’s ruling party under the Bashir regime. Civilians and NCP allies have been presented alongside the army, as happened in the appearance of General Kabbashi with former Sennar Governor Ahmed Abbas and General Al-Burhan’s appearance with the commanders of the Baraa bin Malik battalion, organized by the NCP. Finally, an important indicator is the return of Engineer Ibrahim Mahmoud, the president of the NCP, to the country and his reception as a high dignitary.
It is also possible that the Rapid Support Forces will refuse to return to negotiations if the mediators accept the participation of the Port Sudan camp as a representative of a legitimate government in any negotiating platform, or that it will form a government and demand to be recognized as such by the mediators, this will not only complicate the situation create tremendous strain on current and potential mediators. In sum, the conflict over legitimacy will continue to disrupt negotiations for a peaceful solution. Another key challenge will be whether the RSF will accept any political solution that does not give it a share of power and protect its wealth inside and outside of Sudan, while the Port Sudan camp assumes that it will continue in power, whether peacefully, through a negotiated political solution or by prevailing over the RSF on battlefields.
The second thing that may determine the Port Sudan camp’s susceptibility to negotiations is whether they are able to change conditions on the ground in such a way as to strengthen their position to impose their will through negotiations. Complicating this is the reality that there are contradictions within this camp, in that parts of the Port Sudan camp have political and economic interests in continuing the war, with financial gain from the war economy and increased opportunities for political promotion in a new Port Sudan government. In addition, Egypt, which supports the Port Sudan camp, insists that the army should have the greatest influence in power in any future political arrangements in the aftermath of the war. To make it happen, Egypt has increased its support for the SAF.
Escalation of hostilities
Military confrontations are escalating on the Khartoum, Sennar and El Fasher axes. What is new in this escalation is that SAF has resumed offensive operations, which have not been seen since the first months of the war since which time the army has remained on the defensive. It is possible that if SAF improves its position on the ground, this may have a positive impact on its acceptance of negotiations. However, it is also possible that the RSF will counterattack, especially since the attacking party usually suffers the greatest losses in lives and equipment. With the escalation of operations, it is not far-fetched to speculate that the RSF could expand the war to Blue Nile and Gedaref. Of course, in such a scenario, within weeks, we may be talking about another hot winter of hell for civilians, as the state capitals of Damazin and Gedaref have become two of the largest shelters for people fleeing fighting in other states. If the war expands, we will not only face the death of tens of thousands of people by hunger and bullets, but also mass displacement, perhaps in the millions, towards South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The most important and distressing event in the current escalation and the intransigence of the Port Sudan camp to accept negotiations without preconditions is the announcement by the RSF’s commander Hemedti in his speech on October 9 to stop all negotiations at all levels. This is the first announcement of its kind by the RSF since the establishment of the Jeddah Platform and the subsequent attempts in IGAD, the African Union and finally in Geneva.
The changing nature of the war
The nature of the war is shifting. Eighteen months of war have witnessed indescribable suffering, death, destruction, and loss, including of memory. The war was accompanied by an organized campaign of hate speech and racism, and the result is a state of acute polarization. Most Sudanese are convinced of the validity of their perceptions and only look for facts supporting their perceptions. If these facts do not exist, they create alternative facts and weave entire virtual worlds around those perceptions. This is neither new nor surprising. In war, fear is the primary driver of decision-making, and brings people back to their primary affiliations of tribe and creed. In SAF areas, extremist and racist discourse is used towards individuals from western Sudan, who are assumed to be the base of support for the RSF, and mobilization and recruitment are carried out on an ethnic and tribal basis. The armed forces prefer to form tribal militias rather than recruit directly into the armed forces, pursuing a long-established practice
of reliance on proxy tribal militias to wage war on behalf of the national army. This has made the detention, inhumane treatment, and, worst, the killing of people based on their ethnicity, accent, and facial features a reality.
Jihadist brigades and the so-called Special Forces, formed from remnants of the paramilitary
units of the former National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) have emerged as the work perpetrators. Their forces carried out the most brutal forms of repression in the areas that have been recently reclaimed from the RSF. The ability of a civilian to stay alive in RSF-controlled areas has come to imply that he or she is a collaborator. This attitude will inevitably lead to the killing of more civilians whenever land changes hands. All these factors point to the transformation of this war into a comprehensive civil war based on race, color, and complexion. Discourse to mobilize populations in the northern, eastern and central states against populations from western Sudan, is likely to lead to discrimination against other groups from western Sudan, even those fighting in the ranks of the army alongside it, and ethnic tensions have been observed in the states of River Nile, North, Red Sea, Gedaref and Kassala. If such discourse continues, perhaps the day will come when the allies in the Port Sudan camp will fight each other on ethnic grounds.
In conclusion, four key observations can be drawn from the last year and a half of fighting. First, the multiplicity of negotiation initiatives has proven to be a distraction and created opportunities for the warring parties to procrastinate and manipulate negotiations to gain legitimacy. Second, it is clear that the Port Sudan camp does not hesitate to hold civilians dying of hunger, disease and bullets as hostages to pressure the international community to help it achieve the military objectives that it has failed so far to achieve through military action through negotiations. Third, regional rivalries have contributed to undermining political pressure to bring the parties to the negotiation table without conditions and prioritize protecting civilians. Fourth, will mediators learn from the experience of a year and a half of fighting and failed negotiations to rethink the design of a negotiation process that addresses the aspirations and concerns of the parties to the war in conjunction with talk about ceasefire, cessation of hostilities, and delivery of humanitarian aid? Key actors, whether mediators or political actors in Sudan can develop policy recommendations based on these observations. Unless there is a shift in these dynamics, we are likely to witness ever fiercer fighting, especially as the US role is likely to diminish as the presidential elections approach in early November. In this potential vacuum, Sudanese actors have an opportunity to take the initiative, and the role of regional actors, especially Egypt and the African Union, is expected to increase.
In this context, Sudanese political actors should redouble their efforts to overcome their differences and agree on a common position to end the war and restore Sudan’s transition to democracy.
At the international level as well, it is clear that new approaches are needed. In particular, the international community should:
- Unify all regional efforts led by the African Union under a unified leadership. This should, in particular, define the relationship between the presidential mechanism led by his excellency Ugandan President Museveni and the high-level mechanism for silencing the guns led by Ibn Chambas.
- Target local, civic, and religious leaders and other opinion leaders in a broad campaign to enable them to resist the influence and proliferation of hate speech by both of the warring parties.
- Avoid granting legitimacy to either party. Any granting of recognition to the de facto authorities in Port Sudan is likely to push the RSF to act to push for similar recognition. These actions are likely to increase divisions and complicate the prospects of a political solution.
- Take action to protect civilians and deliver humanitarian aid whether by putting pressure on the parties to increase respect for civilians or by creating safe areas on the borders with Egypt, South Sudan and Chad. These safe areas could be protected by an African peacekeeping force.
- Hold a summit bringing together the African Union and the Arab League, facilitated by the European Union and the Troika to discuss how regional competition, not least the tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt are impacting on the possibility of either decent into regional fighting or conflict resolution and design strategies for minimizing conflict and mobilizing regional actors to promote peace.
- Designing negotiation process in such a way as to address the concerns of both warring parties and dealing with ceasefire and aid access in an integrated manner.
- Develop monitoring mechanisms for monitoring compliance of the warring parties with any negotiated commitments and that they are not manipulating relief for military or political purposes. These verification mechanisms should take advantage of technological innovations to enhance their effectiveness.
Bakry Eljak Elmedni is an assistant professor the in the School of Business, Public Administration and Information Sciences at LIU’s Brooklyn Campus. He has rich and diversified experiences ranging from program design and evaluation, policy and planning, civil society and nonprofit management, to community development with international and local NGOs. He is active in the Taqaddum coalition of civilian forces in Sudan.
